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THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS, 1906 
-* PREFACE .... -
p 
PREFACE. 
The A1geciras Conf"erence can not be thought ot as 
a single isolated. event or 8S the product ot a moment. 
It is linked to the tacts that both precede and follow 
it. There was never a tact in histo17 that dl4 not 
have other facts responsible tor it or was not itself 
responsible for -111 coming after it, and if t he writer 
shall seem to set a rather arbitrary beginning am. em-
ing for t his a cc aunt 0 l' the Oonference, let the reader 
reJDBmber she does so for convenience only, am that the 
present can no more be cut' from the past of whie h it is 
a product than the future can escape being shaped by 
the present. The Conference of A1geciras, tlen, is 
merely an incident, at once a cause and a result, in 
the lOftS storr of Pranco-German friction, of which tle 
origin is obscure and the end yet invisible. 
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INTERNATIONAL FRICTION IN MOROCCO 
THE COllFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 
Chapter I 
International Friction in Morocco 
In the opening years ot the twentietlt centur,. 
there came under the control of a European state tm 
last of the backward nationa, Morocco. For centuries 
during Which more or 1eaa regular diplomatic and com-
mercial relations were carried on with European powers, 
Morocco resiated weatern civilization. That abe had 
been able to hold out longer than countries of the same 
sort as herse1t, especially against control b,. a western 
nation, was due partly to the period ot re1ative1,. 
strong rule which prevailed in the state between 1813 
and 1900, a period which began betore the era. of im-
perialism was thorough1,. started. The countr,. had been 
ably governed by the SUltan, b1ai-e1-Hassan, until his 
death in 1894 when the power tell into tbB hands ot the 
grand visier, :sa-Ahmed. The latter's equally effective 
rule came to an end when he died in 1900. 
The new Sultan was a mere youth, and though inte1-
1isent and attractive, was ill-equipped to wield his 
autborit,.. Unlike the great mass of his people, Abd-
e1-A.sis was inordinately tond of many of the products 
of European civilisation, such aa bicycles, motor-cars, 
photography and tireworks. At length, t~ young man' a 
2 
extravagance empti ed the )(oroccan treasu17. In an 
attempt to save the situation, the government increased 
the taxes. The new taxes not only were extremely heavy 
1:nt also _re in violation ot the Koran. Under t~se 
circumstances, the natives. who thoroughly resented their 
.ultants conduct, revolted. The political and religious 
ties ot t he people began to give way. By 1903 the Moroooan 
capital, Pez, was threatened by the rebels, and the SUltan' I 
authority extended to only a few towns. He had no money, 
theretore no ar.,-. One writer has compared Morocco to a 
feudal state ot a type to be found in Europe about tm 
year 1000.1 • Indeed, it was little else; the Sultan was 
Sultan in name onlJ. Even the geography ot tm oountry 
militated against national unity. Thus, lIorooco was a 
lovely morsel ready to be devoured by a hungrJ Mediter-
ranean nation seeking lources of food supplies, raw mater-
ia1s, markets and strategically located lam. Purthermore, 
an excellent excuse tor intervention in Moroocan attairs 
existed. '1'h8 disorder in the counttwy', which naturally 
endangered the lives and property of foreigners, made pro-
tection of them an urgent international q nest ion. 
Aside from the fact of 8 relatively strong internal 
sovernment under MUlai-EI-Bas88n, it is to be wondered 
why Morocco was not already taken in taw by one rI the 
great western powers. The reason is simple enough. The 
nations which chiefly coveted Morocco were those having 
I·B, E. Schmitt, England and Germany 1'740-1914,22Sf 
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Western Mediterranean interests, i.e., Great Britain, 
Germany, France, Spain and Italy. J(orocco was con-
tiguous to the French and Spanish possessions in J'orthern 
Africa and was situated near to spain on the Straits of 
Gibraltar. She was also on the r~te to South Africa. 
Oat or the fact of her location, then, grew a conflict 
of strategic interests between the powers. Though each 
of the 'Western nations concerned longed to gain the upper 
hand in Morocco, each suspected that the others would 
take advantage of their position if sim1le.rly situated. 
Bence, the powers desired to maintain a state of affairs 
which should keep every foreign nation in Morocco within 
well defined limits. To achieve this end had been tm 
actual purpose of a Conference held at Madrid in 1880. 
'I'he Conference, in settling a number of c oDlllercial pro-
blema, had concluded that every nation represented at 
Madrid should have most-favored-nation treatment in 
Morocco. '!'he SUltan t 8 independence and sovereign.ty 
were, of course, guaranteed. It might be added that 
up to 1903, at least, foreign trade with Morocco was 
not large. BUt, a8 it has been aptly put, "Increasing 
insecurity of foreigners and the Sultan's need for loans 
foreshadowed the end of Moroocan independence."l. 
'!'here was, however, one nation that had been 
intensely alert to conditions in Morocco, and was turn-
liE.N.Anderson, 'I'he First Moroccan Crisis, 1904. Mg*" 4. Hereafter this work will '6e cited a8 
erson, Moroccan Crisis. 
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ing them to advantage at every opport1mity. Like her 
sister states, France had declared herself in favor of 
the status quo in Morocco, but, like them also, not 
through any special respect which she entertained toward 
the North African country, for sbe had no desire to see 
Morocco reform herself. France's main idea was to pre-
vent any other Power from gaining too much influence. 
The foregoing polic7 was pursued through the 1890's, 
after which came a visible change. A. combination of 
factors might be said to have been responsible. 
The international situation was especially favor-
able to a change of policy. Three of the Powers inter-
ested in Mediterranean affairs were laden with troubles 
of their own: Great Britain occupied with the Boer War; 
Italy defeated by Abyssinis in 1896, and Spain by the 
United States in 1898. The internal disintegration of 
Morocco has already been referred to above. But even a 
favorable international situation might not have been 
sufficient to induce an unwilling nation to embark upon 
an imperialistic program likely to prove a rough sea. 
There were other forces at work. 
The French people had been carefUlly prepared for 
the day when France should be able to extend her African 
possessions to include Morocco. Development of an atti-
tude favorable to colonial acquisition, particularly in 
Africa, was largely the work of an organization having 
a small but distinguished membership -- the Comit' de 
5 
!'Afrisue francaise. Because of the high position held 
by many of the members in state affairs, tl:e Comite was 
in a position to exercise considerable influence upon 
the French government as well as on the nation. The 
, 
Comite went so far as to formulate a policy which it 
desired to see the govemment pursue, and which the 
latter did come to follow to a large extent. This polioy 
may be summed up, in general, as follows: 
(1) The Frenoh government was to make agreements 
with interested states respecting Morocco: 
(2) The sovereignty of the SUltan end the integrity 
of his land to be assured; 
(3) The freedom of t ~ Straits to be adequately 
guaranteed; 
(4) Satisfaction for the legitimate interests of 
the powers, considered chiefly economic, through 
full oommercial liberty; 
(5) Recognition of Spain's territorial claims; 
(6) "Paoific penetration" to be the method used in 
wirming Morocco by means 0 f oontrol over the 
Sultan, who was the sole source of religious 
and political authority~ Pacific penetration 
would gain the good will of the Prmoh people 
and would prevent other powers from tsking 
offense. 
The Comit"s arguments in behalf of its policy ranged 
from the reasonable to the ridiculous, l:nt its oampaign 
was highly successful and nearly the Whole nation was 
6 
converted to the Morocco policy_ 
All that was then 1ac~ing to make a change in 
the government's policy both positive and effective 
was a leader fired with the ideas of the Oomite and 
intelligent enough to make them a reality. Such a one 
was M. Theophile Delcasse, who became Minister of 
Foreigh Affairs in 1898. velcassJ was a strange man, 
to say the least, a highly uncommunicative person who 
immediate17 assumed complete independence in performing 
the functions of his office. Taking advantage of 
Par1ia.ment's preoccupation with internal affairs, he 
carried out his policy of maintaining and developing 
French interests. He aimed at increasing French 
prestige and rounding out her possessions in Africa. 
Oontrol of Morocco would be a source of defense to 
France, because of its proximity to France's other 
African possessions, as seen by a glance at the map_ 
To sum up the situation, we see that all the conditions 
were favorable to an aggressive policy on the part of 
France in Morocco. The powers most like17 to be inter-
ested were busy with their own affairs; the Moroccan 
government waa on the verge of col1aps e; the French 
people were in the right frame of mind; and France had 
a foreign minister oapable of leading the way. 
The French bad had occasion for close contact 
with the Moroccan government for many years. As far 
back, in fact, as 1845 a treaty had been signed between 
the two countries which rought1y fixed the boundary line 
between Algeria and Morocco. The unrest in the latter 
country had given rise to innumerable raids in Algeria 
by savage tribes. The French complained loudly and de-
manded protection, which the sultans were in no position 
to give. Accordingly, the local Algerian authorities 
otten took it upon themselves to pursue the tribes across 
the inde~inite boundary into their own country in order 
to subdue them. Then it would be the Moroccan (Jovem-
ment's turn to complain. Friction was almost continuous 
and sharp words were o~ten visited by the French upon 
the SUltan. SUch was the case in 1901, owing to the 
tact that attacks by Moroccans on Algeria had inoreased. 
This tilll8 the Sultan appealed to Great Britain and Ger-
many tor aid. The Mission he sent to London was merely 
warned by Lord Landsdowne that i~ the Sultan could not 
keep order, Franoe would have to defend her interests. l 
Germany was tndifferent, though she was not to remain 
so tor long. In the end, a new treaty was srranged 
between France and Morocoo, when the latter sent a 
special mission to France to settle the boundary trouble. 
But the treaty of 1901 left the boul'liar'f as uncertain 
as it had been, for De1casse had no intention ot creating 
a careful1.,. isolated Morocco}!· Having an indef1nite 
l_G.p.GoOCh, History ot Modern Eurottil8~8-19l9, 
341. Hereafter this work will be c as GOOCh, 
Modern Europe. 
2·Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 14. 
-------~--- ---
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border line between the two countries was for France 
like having a foot in the door. 
There were several interesting provisions in this 
~reaty, interesting in the light of French policy. One 
created a zone between the two countries within two 
lines drawn through what was definitely known to be 
Moroccan and Algerian territory. The tribes living in-
side the zone were themselves to choose whether they 
wished to reside under French or Moroccan authority. 
Moroooans and Algerians were to be free to enter the 
zone for commercial and other punposes. Moreover, 
tribes of either country owning pasture lands in the 
other might st ill use them. Each country was to appoint 
two commissioners to settle border disputes. Eaoh was 
privileged to set a line of posts for defense purposes 
in territory definitely its own.l • In 1902 two other 
treaties were negot1a ted by France with Morocoo. They 
laid down a complete program of m1li tary, politioal, and 
economic cooperat1on between them. 2 • 
It was qui te a pparent that the Sultan could not 
hope to main tain order in and along the frontier of 
Morocoo without help; so he requested the aid of a few 
I·Ibid.,15 from Ministere des Etrangeres,Dooument 
dipiomatique, affaires du Maroc! 1901-1905. (Hereafter this Livre jaune wil be cited as ~. 
1901-1905) 15ff., No. 20 and annexe. 
2·Ibid., I?, from L.J.,1901-1905, 26ff., No.24; 
33f1' ., No. 2?f. 
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French military instructors, who were supplied him. 
A Frenoh bank also advanced him a small loan. At the 
same time, however, the Sultan sent another miSSion 
under one of his advisers, Kaid Maclean, and ex-British 
soldier, to Great 'Britain and Germany to seoure help in 
stopping Prench interterence. The Vission met with the 
same tailure as the earlier ones .1. When 1903 rolled 
around br:frI8lng with 1 t the revolt in Morocco already 
mentioned, the Sultan taand himself in such dire straits 
that he was glad enough to accept the loan of 22,000,000 
tranos guaranteed on the customs which Prance adVanced 
to him tor the purpose ot oarry1ng out reforms.2 • Tlms 
unwillingly he began to tall in with Delcass'.a pol1cr 
of "Pacifio penetration", whioh it was hoped should some 
day bring Moroooo oompletely under Frenoh oontrol. Al-
though the French Foreign lfinister's instructions to the 
French representative at Tangier oaretully required 
the t the SuI tan be as sured ot French re speot tor the 
sovereignty and integrity of his land, and ot Franoe's 
desire to give him neighborly assistanoe, they also re-
quired the representative to support all enterprises, 
philanthropio, oommeroial and industrial, tending to 
augment French influence in Morooco .3. 
l·G.T.Gooch & Harold Temperley, eds., British 
Doouments on the orifins of the War,II, 272t., 
10.328. Hereafter hIs work wil! be oited as ~ 
2·Anderson, lforoocan criSiS, 18, fr. L.j., 53ff, Bo.3; 
3·Ib1d ., 16, from L.j., 1901-5, l8ff., No. 21. 
-
10 
In the meantime, what of the other nations that 
might have reason to be intensely interested in France's 
relations with Morocco' I De1casse by no means over-
looked the possibility of competitors suddenly con-
fronting him, however preoccupied they might be at 
present with their own affairs. Securing the good-
will of these nations beoame, therefore, a very import-
sot part of his polioy. He won the neutrality of Italy, 
Spain and Great Britain by establishing ententes with 
them. The negotiations bringing about these unlerstand- . 
ings prooeeded for the most part simultaneously, but 
they will be discussed separately for purposes of clarity. 
I De1oasse's first triumph of diplomacy was the 
entente established with Italy in 1902. In 1881 Italy's 
attitude toward Franoe had been considerably embittered 
by the latterts seizure of Tunis whioh Italy ooveted 
greatly. The bard feelings thus engendered resulted in 
a ten year tariff war between the two countries, and in 
Italy's entry into alliance with Germany and Austria-
HUngary. Italy soon disoovered that the Alliance which 
she had entered mostly as a protest directed toward 
Franoe was of little use to her, that she even suffered 
beoause of it.1 • Wherefore, she undertook in 1898 to 
bring about a rapprochement with her neighbor on the 
north. The trouble over TUnis was settled that same 
l·B.D., I, 285, Bo. 355; 286, Bo.356. 
-
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year • Two years la ter the tariff war between Italy 
and France was ended by a commercial treaty.l. 
, 
In 1898 Delcasse, quick to foster the new situa-
tion, visited Rome. Italy having given up all hope in 
regard to Tunis had accordingly turned her eyes on 
Tripoli as a substitute. 
, 
Delcasse proceeded to use 
the object of Italy's new desires as a means whereby 
he might win Italian recognition of France's prefer-
ential position in Morocco. He was entirely success-
ful. On December 14, 1900, a secret agreement was 
reached between France and Italy. According to the 
treaty Italy recognized that action taken by France 
to exercise and safeguard the rights resulting for 
her from the proximity of her territory to Morocco, 
would not be considered prejudicial to the interest 
of Italy as a Mediterranean power. Furthermore, in 
case a modification of the political and territorial 
status of Morocco should result, Italy would '"reserve 
for herself, as a reciprocal measure, the right of 
eventually developing her influence in Cyrenaic 
Tripolitaine~' 2. As one may readily see, the above 
statement was somewhat vague and gave to Italy a nega-
tive sort of assurance. 
I-Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 20, from Die Grosse 
Politik der Eriropa!schen tibinette, 18~914, 
XVIII, "rI1r,' 10 5835. lereafter thiS work wIll be 
cited as G.P. 
-2 
-Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 22, quoting ~, 




Italy was patently anxious for better terms in 
regard to Tripoli. There was, however, from the French 
standpoint, at least, one obstaole whioh had to be 
leaped or got around in some way. This was Italy's 
obligation as a party to the Triple Allianoe. France 
wanted to make sure that the Alliance, renewable in 
1902, should contain no olause aggressive toward her. 
In June, 1901, the Italian Foreign Minister verbally 
promised the French Ambassador to Italy that the re-
newal treaty between the central Powers and Italy would 
conta1n nothing hostile to France, in return for which 
declaration of Italy's rights in Tripoli were put on 
the same basis as those of France in Morocco. The bur-
den of his conversation was embodied in notes exohanged 
between Franoe and Italy on BoveDi>er 1, 1902, whioh 
constituted a formal, but secret agreement oontaining 
~ the following olause insisted on by De1casse: 
'"In case Franoe (Italy) shall be the objeot of 
a direot or indireot aggression on the part of 
one or several Powers, Italy (Franoe) will pre-
serve a striot neutrality. The same will bold in 
oase Franoe (Italy) as a result of direot provo-
oation is for oed to take, for the defense of her 
honor or seourity, the initiative of a deo1aration 
of war."' 1. 
l.~., 31, quoting ~, 1900-2, 4f.,Bo.3;6,Bo.5. 
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'!'hus ended the twenty year quarrel between the 
two Lat~D nations, publicly announced by the vi~ of 
President Loubet of France to Victor Emmanuel in 1904. 
Though Italy had obtained what she wanted, a recogni-
tion of her claims to Tripoli, yet she found herself 
with a foot in each international camp, a position which 
was to prove a rather uncomfonable one, as we shall see. 
, 
Delcass8 gained more than the direct end he had in view, 
that of settlement of the Morocco question as far as 
Italy was concerned. The Triple Alliance, already weak-
ening, had received a severe blow despite the German 
Chancellor~ famous remark to the effect that in a happy 
marriage a husband does not mind his wife's 1ndu1ging 
1n an innocent extra dance.I • What is more, the draw-
ing of Italy away from Germa1l7 marked, if not the end, 
of French isolation, (a thing of the past by 1898,) at 
least the beg1nning of German 1so1ation. 
The establishment of the entente with Spain was 
accomplished at the end of a rather rocky diplomatic 
road. I Delcasse realized that Spain was entitled to a 
special position in Morocco as was France. Spain'S 
proximity to Morocco, her history of past attempts at 
conquest of the country, her economic interests there 
and the number of Spanish in Morooco, which was greater 
than that of any other foreign nation, had all test1fied 
to the fact that Spain could not be ignored 1n any dis-
pOSition of Morocco among the Powers. Spa in had, however, 
1.Gooch, Modern Europe, 341. 
14 
been satisfied with the status quo and bad not recip-
-----
rocated warmly the advances made to her by' Franoe in 
1898-1900.1• Nevertheless, when she saw the progress 
Franoe was making in the region baok of Morocco, she 
awoke to the danger to Spanish interests there,2·and 
decided that if the territory was to be divided, Spain 
would olaim the northern part. It was Spain, then, 
who opened direct negotiations with France over Morocco, 
I but it was France who ga med the most through De1oasse, 
who was unwilling that spain should have as much terri-
tory as she desired. The negotiation dragged along for 
some tiDl8. Finally, in 1902 an agreement was reaohed 
upon three main bases: 
(1) 'rhe two oountries adhered to the prinCiple 
of the paoifio penetration of Moroooo; 
(2) Franoe promised Spa.in diplomatic support in 
the execution of the treaty; 
(3) Spain was to receive as her sphere-of influenoe 
almost allot the old kingdom of Fez, ino1ud-
ing the Capitol and Tangier in the north; 
France was to get the rest .3. 
Unfortuna te1Y" for Spain, a 8 it proved later, the agree-
mant tell through because the conservative government 
whioh had just come into power in Spain feared the atti-
tude of Great Britain who did express her desire to be 
l·B.n.,II, 258, No.3ll. 
-
2·Ibid ., 259, No.314; 260, No.316. 
-
3. f 33 Ibid, II, 279, Bo.336; 306f ., No.364;lII, , 
No.34; 35, No.37, No.41; 31t., No.32. 
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considered in the discussions over Korocco. 
I Negotiations lapsed for a time while Delcaeee 
began to treat with Great Britain. Throughout the 
Anglo-French negotiations Spain revealed her anxiety 
lest Spanish interests should not receive due consider-
ation, Sbe thought that she should have been included 
in the discussions over Morocco.1• In 1904,negotia-
tions were reopeaed between France and Spain, and a 
new agreement was reached, although Spain considered 
the terms given her much interior to those proffered 
her in 1902. Spain particularly objected to a clause 
, 
which Delcasse at the last moment wanted included. 
By it she would be precluded from taking any action 
in her sphere of influence until the sta tus ~ in 
Morocco should come to an end. Spain felt that this 
prohibition upon Spanish action would give France an 
excellent chance to establish herself in Morocco in 
such a manner that Spain could never claim that the 
political status of Morocco had been altered, and thus 
be able to assert her rights to a sphere ot influenoe.2 • 
Nevertheless, Spain had to accept pretty muoh what 
France and Great Britain between them were willing to 
ooncede to her. 
The Oonvention between Franoe and Spain, whioh 
was secret, was signed at Paris, Ootober 3, 1904. 
l·Ibid., III, 39, No.44. 
2· Ibid ., 39, No. 44. 
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Acoording to it Spain adhered to the Anglo-~ench 
agreement of the previous April. There is no need to 
discuss here the various articles of the treaty. Suffice 
it to say that such subjects as the boundary line between 
the two spheres, Joint economio enterprises, military 
action, and oontraband in Morocco were dealt with. The 
clause Declass~ had desired was also incorporated and 
Spain promised not to alienate the territory she would 
receive.l • By this tree. ty the rapproohemen t between 
Franoe and Spain became a reality. Delcasse had ~ined 
another nation's recogn1tion of Franoe's preferent1al 
claims in Moroooo. 
During the long drawn out Spanish negotiations, 
conversations with Great Britain were be~n in 1903 
anent the establishment of oordial relations between 
England and Fran ce • Delcasse was keenly aware of the 
necessity of gaining British approval of the aims he 
wished to achieve in regard to Abd-el-Aziz' s helpless 
oountry. He had made advances to Great Britain earlier 
than 1903 but they had met with slight suocess .2. There 
were a number of faotors in the business not calculated 
, 
to make Deloasse's task an easy one. Franoe was still 
smarting from the injury to her pride sufhred at the 
hands of the British in the Fashada incident of 1898. 
Furthermore, both countries were the respective allies 
of two nations at swords points in the Far East, 
l·For the terms of this treaty see Ibid.,49,No.59. 
2. ~,I,163,No.188;1?1,No.198. 
1'7 
namely, Rusaia and Japan. Besides, British influence 
in Morocco was growing apace. , De1casse was anxious to 
prevent an Anglo-German alliance}· Hence he cu1ti-
vated assiduously German friendship and twice in 1901 
made advances to Germany to establish an accord.2• 
Both attempts were fruitless but were offset by the 
failure of the Anglo-German agreement to materialize. 
As it turned out, the business and political groups 
in Great Britain and France eased the French Foreign 
Minister's path by agitating for improved relations 
between their respective nations. 
In May 1903 King Edward paid what turned out 
to be a very Buccessful visit to Paris, which was 
returned by President Loubet and Delcass' two months 
later. The negotiations begun then and continuing un-
til April 1904 amounted to little more than mere bar-
gaining. France was dominated by the desire to gain 
British recognition. of her peculiar interest in Morocco; 
Great Britain, on the other ham, saw in this situation 
a splendid opportunity for the settlement of the Egyp-
tian problems. Although the RusBo-Japanese war break-
ing out in February, 1904 , complieated matters, an agree-
ment was eventually attained as a result of compromise. 
Three documents comprised the Accord of April 8, 1904. 
We are interested in the third agreement which concerned 
1·Ibid .,162,Bo.18'7. 
2·Anderson,Moroccan crisie,45, from G.P.,XVIII, 
28ff, Nos.5·3-93r-~9~5r.--~----
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Egypt and Morocco. As in the case of the Spanish 
agreement there is no need to go into the details of 
this treaty.L The significant fact is, that each ot 
the two countries agreed to surrender its rights and 
interests in the backward nation coveted by the other; 
that is to say, France would keep her hands off Egypt; 
Great Britain would do the same in regard to Morocco. 
Supplementary to the public agreement there were five 
secret articles which boldly laid down a program of 
action to be taken in case the Sulten should cease to 
exercise authority. Great Britain promised to FRance 
full diplometic support in carrying out the program. 
As lIr. Anderson has strikingly seid, "The doctors were 
agreeing upon a division of the patient's property 
b&fore they began to operate."~· France's secret 
agreement with Spain end Great Brits.in were quite ob-
viously in violation of the open door principle. 
I Wben we come to a consideration of M. De1casse's 
policy in regard to Germany, those who are of a liter-
ary turn of mind may possibly be reminded of the great 
characters in Shakespearean tragedy whose unhappy ends 
were often the result of a tragic flaw in their person-
a1ties. I M. Delcasse seemed almost to be the victim of 
such a flaw, although luckily for the immediate peace of 
l·~.fII, 3~3ff., No.417. 
2. nd U A erson, _oroccan CriSiS, 106. 
.. 
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the world no fatal event occured as a result of it. 
I To be sure, De1casse had made an honest effort to win 
the fr1endship of Germany. He had even atte.pted to 
bring about an accord. Nevertheless, he seems to have 
completely under-estimated the tnterest which Germany 
m1ght manifest in the future or Morocco, though he 
might have suspected it. Be that as it may, he ve17 
casua11,- 1nformed German,- of the Anglo-French agree-
ment through the German Ambassador to France. Fear-
1ng thst formal announcement would provoke discussion, 
he no doubt hoped that his comparative silence would 
gain a tacit acceptance by Germany or his policy. 
I ' Wbstever De1casse thought, he cont1nued pac1fic 
penetration throughout 1904. The loan made to the Sul-
tan had brought tba Moroccan customs almost entirely 
under French control. Further acts of banditry em-
phasized the pressing need for reforms in Morooco and 
gave France additional opportUlrlfdesto take the lead in 
introducing them. The Jl'rench government proceeded to 
outltne a complete plan of ~eform. M. Saint-Rene 
Tail1a.nd1er was dispatched in 1905 to Fez to persuade 
the Sultan to adopt the plan" Of course, the French 
envoy was carefully instructed to impress upon the 
Sultan that France was a cting mere 1,- in a fr1end1y 
sp1rit in offering to help him estab11sh a strong gov-
ernment, a thing be was to understand was poss ible on1,. 
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through close cooperation between the Moroccan and 
French governments.1• According to the plan French 
officers were to help train the Moroccan police so 
that order might be restored. The scheme of reform 
also included the building of roads and telegraph8~as 
well as the establishment of a state bank.2 • The envoy 
did not find the Sultan in a very receptive mood, al-
though the latter conceded the practicability of some 
of tbe ret'orms. It was necessary, the Sultan sald, 
t'or them to be dis cussed with the lIaghZen. While these 
discussions were going on and Rene-Taillandier was toil-
ing to wring acceptance from the Moroocans, Germn,. sud-
den1,. awoke to whe. t was going on and uttered a clarion 
protest. 
The German polic,. throughout the peri od of the 
Moroccan crisis and the Oonference of' A1gerciras was 
most uncertain and therefore dit'ficu1t to fathom.3• 
The direction of German foreign po1lcy seemed to be a 
case ot' too man,. cooks spoiling the broth. 'rhe Kaiser 
insisted upon taking a hand in the conduct ot' t'oreign 
"lations with the result that Oount BUlow, the German 
Secretary of State t'or Foreign Af'fairs, and later Chan-
. 
cel10r, spent 8 good deal of his ttme oorrecting the 
mistakes of the Emperor. Furthermore, thou€#l Bulow 
had id4as of his own, he was oonstant1,. open to the 
1eGoOOh, Modern Europe, 348 from L.j.,l901-6, 
1791"1", No.2W. 
2 e Ibid • 
-
3eBD.III, "General Report on GermanI for 1906, 
Man4, 190'7. Ii 433 e 
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persuasive influenoe of Baron Von Holstein in the 
Foreign office, whom many considered as almost a 
psychopath. There was no cont1nuity, no real direction 
to German policy. Consequently, other nations could 
not be expected to mow Germany's intentions, if Ger-
many herself apparently did not know what she wanted}-
Although at first German government was frierxily 
to the Anglo-French agreement of April, 1904,2. later 
in the year the Germs.n Ambassador to Great Britain 
in conversation with Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Sec-
retary, stated that Germany wanted the status ~ and 
the open door to prevail in Morocco, and that she nJ:lant 
"to uphold any rights which she was entitled to claim 
in Morocco under existing treaties".3. At the time the 
Anglo-French agreement was concluded Bulow saw no cause 
for alarm, while the Kaiser told King Edward the. t Morocco 
had never interested him.4 This attitude on the part 
of official Germany may account in part at least for 
Delcasse's fundamental error in not reaChing some defi-
l·Ibid., 429. 
2·Andersan, Moroooan Crisis, l4lf., quoting Ber-
nard von Bulow, Reden, (tetpZlg,1903), II, 74,84, 
90t. 
3.~, III, 53, No.52. 
4· Ibid., IV., 1, NO;1~bid.,2, No.2; Sidney Lee, 
Kin, Edward, VII, II, 292fr., also ~, XIX, 
186 f., 101.6038 and 6040. 
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nite urilerstandlng with Germany oonoerning tle future 
of Morocco. However that may be, the Pan-Germans 
soon raised 8. hue am cry throughout Germany to tle 
effect that German economic interests were being sad-
ly neglected and that Germany should uphola ~r rights. 
The sending of the Frenoh envoy to Pez was the 
occas ion for a sudden ohange of German foreigh policy. 
The German 6harg4 at Tangier, Kuhlmann, remarkea that 
Franoe had made a "bad mistake" in thinking that the 
agreement with Spain and Great Britain settled the 
internat10nal side of' the question}- Germany hurried 
to bolster up the Sultan in his opposition to France. 
She demanded the status quo. 
Holstein, at this moment, oonoeived the idea of 
the Kaiser's paying a visit to the Sultan by way of 
making a political demonstration whioh should bring 
the Moroccan affair into prominenoe, be of benefit to 
Germany's eoonomic interests in Morocco, and embarrass 
Delcass'. Bulow, who by this time was German Chanoellor, 
acoepted the idea at onoe. The Kaiser, however, was not 
in sympathy with the plan, and had to be persuaded to 
take part in the af'f'air. Even at the last moment when 
about to leave his yacht at Tangier, Maroh 3,1905, he 
tried to use the roughness of the sea and the sort of' 
horse he should have to ride as exouses for not pro-
l·E.T.a. Dugdale, German ui1lomatic Documents 
18?1-19l4,III, 220r, Ro. ~6 • 
Hereafter this work will be Cited as G.D.D./II. 
23 
ceed1ng with the demonstrs.tion. As for tle Moroccans, 
they apparently looked forward to the Emperor's visit~ 
as a possible check upon French des1gns.L Bulow in a 
four page telegram had taken pains to instruct W'1lliam 
II as to what he should say in the speeches tm latter 
would make a t Tangier. The Kaiser was to encourage the 
Moroccans 1n their resistance to France and arouse un-
easiness in the French, but he was not to commit Germany 
to anything definite. As reported, the Kaiser's speech 
to the Sultan's representative ran, as follows: He 
declared that "he had great interest in the welfare and 
prosperity of the Moroccan Empire, that he visited the 
Sultan as an independent ruler, and that he hoped under 
the authority of the Sultan a free Morocco would be 
opened to the peaceful competit ion of all ns. tions with 
out monopoly or exclusion." 2. 
The Tangier demonstrat10n proved to be a blunder, 
s diplomatic failure of the first order. This was for 
two main reasons. In the first place the Emperor~, whom 
King Edward called Europe's "enfant terrible", talked 
too freely and thus bound Germany more tightly in respect 
to her Moroccan policy than Bulow had wanted;3· in the 
l·B.D.~II, 58, No. 68. 
2. Anderson, Moroccan CriSis, 193f., quoting the 
version of t 113 speech published in Al1gemaine 
Zeitung (Munich) April 4,1905. 
3·see Bulow's instructions to the Kalser, Anderson, 
Moroccan criSiS, 190r., quoting from G.P., XX,272ff., 
WOe 65'741r. 
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seoond plaoe the visit oemented the entente between 
Great Britain and France, the least desirable happen-
ing for German7. But the fat was in the fire and. it 
was to fry for a long t!me. 
, 
Delcasse and the French 
polic1 in Morocco had been openly ohallenged. 
Before go1ng further, let us see if we can draw 
at least a few tentative conclusions with regard to the 
mot1ves wh1ch may have lain behind Germanr's foreign 
policy. It 1s evident enough, I think tbt t Germany 
when she became olearl7 aware of Franoe's intent10ns 
in respect to Morocco,was trulr concerned about the 
future of her economic interests in thBt country. Con-
sequently, She demanded the maintenance of the status 
quo and the open door. But it was also evident that 
the status ~ was impossible. German7 revealed her 
recognition of this fact when she complained about 
France t s failure to consult her in regard to Morocoo. 
What, then, did she want? Proteotion of her economic 
interests was certainly not the sum total of her desires. 
Various possible explanations of her polic7 have inoluded 
Germany's desire to maintain her prestige, to gain com-
pensation somewhere;' to acquire naval bases and coaling 
stations, to establish a German Morooco which should 
neutralize Frenoh Algeria in case of war, to become a 
Mediterranean power~~' and to destroy the Entente 
l.E.Brandenb~From Bismarok to the Wo~ld War; a 
H~8to~ of German Forel~ P01107,1810-1914, 229r.; 
B.D.D.,III. 220f., No.7. 
2·B.E:SChmitt, England and German{,1740-1914,233. 
Schmitt sa7s Germany never iiaml ted tbese"'""things. 
.. 
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Cordia Itt. We shall keep these possibilitie s in mini 
as we proceed with our study. 
By April, 11, the FrenCh envoy at Fez reported 
that the Sultan had consented to have his tro~s at Tan-
gier, Rabat, Casablanca and Ujda organized on French 
.odele. The progress he had thus made was completely 
undone, however, upon arrival of a Gertllln envoY', Count 
Tattenbach, on May 13. In about two weeks tb9 Count had 
so influenced the Sultan that the latter rejected the 
French scheme of reforms:· A British mission which 
arrived a couple of days after was unable to reverse 
the decision. The SUltan gave as an explanation of 
his conduct the excuse that he could only accept the 
French plans if ratified by the powers.2• What did 
that mean? The international friction in Morocco had 
reached the point where a way out of the difficulty had 
to be found. Was the Sultan suggesting one, and if so, 
was it his own idea end wOl1ld it work? 
l·Anderson, loroccan crisis,225, from G.P. XX, 
392, No. 6672. ---
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Chapter II 
The way OUt: An International Conference. 
The Sultan's way out proved to be an interBational 
Conference of the powers signatory to t~ Madrid Con-
vention of 1880. The conference should pess upon the 
French proposals. The Sultan's move was patently of 
German orlgin.~ The German press had for some time 
been advocating a conference and early in April before 
the German envoy reached Fez, the German govern men t sent 
out clrculars to the powers to sound their attitude to-
ward such a meeting.2. 
The story of the period prior to the aotual hold-
ing of the Algeciras Conferenoe is as neoessary to the 
story of the Conference proper, as a key is neoessary to 
open a locked door. To omit a discussion of the diplo-
macy of this period would be like arriving at a play at 
the begiming of the last act and expecting to under-
stand what the characters were about without knowledge 
of what had transpired earlier. In considering,then, 
the diplomatic relations leading up to the Conference 
of Algeoiras, we see that they fall rather naturally 
lnto two major phases: flrst, the period of Germany's 
struggle to bring the Conference about; second, the 
perlod of the struggle by the powers (chlefly French 
and German) to agree on the program. These divlsions 
I·B.D.,III, 88, No. 106. 
-
2·Ibid., 66, No. 78 
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made in something so fundamentally continuous as history 
may be excused perhaps on the ground thBt they make for 
clarity, always at a premium in any consideration of 
European politics. 
The action taken by Germany in the shs.pe of the 
Tangier demonstration required to be followed up, hence 
the circular note sent to the powers. The reaotion which 
the German goverament received for its trouble was not 
very satisfactory. Austria-Hungary and Russia disapproved 
of Germany's action.~ The other nations tried to evade 
the is sue and hung back to let France take the lead. 
Spain declared she oould not adhere to the German pro-
posal unless Franoe and Great Britain agreed to do so. 
The sudden looming of the German Michee 1 on the French 
horizon frightened the country into a oritioism of the 
policy of its Foreign Minister, ne1oasse, who heartily 
opposed a Conferenoe and s ought to reach a direct settle-
ment of the misunderstamtng between GernJiny and Franoe. 
Italy also urged direot settlement but Germany responded 
to Deleass8B overtures by insisting on the Conferenoe. 
The motives behind German aotions are well set 
forth in instruotions given by Bulow to Count Tatten-
bach on April 30, 1905. In expla ining Germany's desire 
for a Conference, he says: 
l·Amerson, Moroccan crisiS, 206 from G.P., XX, 
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'"Evon if, therefore, Prance were inclined to 
permit us to conquer a part of Morocco, we would 
for the present perhaps not be in a position to 
take advantage of this overturo. In realIty, we 
are confronted with the alternative either of 
relinquishing Morocco now to France without ade-
quate compensation to Germany, or of working for 
the extension of tb:) life of tba Sberifian Empire 
in the expectation of a turn of events favorable 
to us. Thus, I perceive your important task to 
be in holding the future free for the profit of 
German interests. I sum it up in stating that you 
should bring the Sultan to declare that he could 
consider the French demands only if they were ad-
vised by a conference of all the signatory Powers. 
The reference to the conference I cons ider for the 
SUltan the easiest and for us the most favorable 
fODm of refusal. That the Sultan refuse the French 
, 
demands is naturally the main thing." 1. 
In speaking of maintaining the state of Morocco until a 
favorable turn of events, and of keeping the future free, 
Bulow probably had in mind the time when GertSn public 
opinion should be solidly behind a policy of colonial 
acquisition and the time when the German navy should be 
capable of winning and preserving a colonial Empire. It 
is evident also, I think, from t~ instructions, that 
l·Ibid., 2lSf. 
29 
Bulow was confident that no Conference of the powers 
would accept the French plan of reforms. 
Unfortunately, at this time there developed in 
I France much opposition to Delcasse and his policies. 
The opposition resulted from a number of factors, such 
as Delcass"s lang tenure of office, his independent 
methods, and the enmity between him and the French Premier, 
M. Rouvier, who believed that France should treat Germany 
and Great Britain alike in regard to Morocco. Rouvier 
suggested that an exchange of notes between France am 
the powers might be all that was necessary to settle the 
I trouble, but his proposal met the same fate as Delcassets 
proposal for direct settlement between the two nations. 
The Kaiser t s excuse for German refusal to settle directly 
with France was that Germany was championing the cause of 
the world)· As for Great Britain, she could not under-
stand Why there Should be so much international difficulty 
over what ths Marquess of Lansdowne pleased to call a 
"diplomatic oversight" on the part of Delcass~.2. In 
the meantime, Germany suggested that France herself call 
a Conference. She naturally refused to do so. Then the 
Sultan on May 30, 1905 issued his Olm invitations to a con-
ference to consider the French plans of reform. 
l·J.B.SishoP, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times,I, 
469. Hereafter this work will be cIted as B1Sh~E' 
Roosevelt,I. 
2·~.,III, 68, No. 83. 
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A little earlier, Ge~ny had approached the 
United states, urging her to persuade Great Britain 
to aooept a oonference. President Roosevelt replied 
that the United states had not enough interests at 
stake to warrant entangling herself in the matter, but 
that she was not averse to trying to help the establish-
ment of B. friendly feeling between Germany end Great 
Britain, provided it was clearly understood that the 
United states was not taking sides.'l, Great Brite.in, 
however, remained hostile to a conference, 
Delcasse, supported by Great Britain, olung to 
his polioy of oPPosition also, but his colleagues:were 
frightened as to the outoome if he oontinued thus. Ger-
many threa tened war and demanded the eliminat ion t£ the 
Foreign Minister_ Deloasse was convinced thst GermaI'l'J 
was bluffing, but Premier Rouvier thought differently 
when Prinoe Henokel von Donnersmark in visiting Paris 
, 
remarked that "If you (~e French) think that your For-
eign Minister has engaged your oountry in a too adven-
turous path, show it by separating yourselves from him, 
and above all by giving your foreign policy a new orienta-
tion. The Emperor does not wish for war, but if you are 
I 
beaten you will be bled white."2. The British Government 
apparently did not fear war, sinoe she believed Germany 
far too weak on the sea to attempt such a thing,3. 
1.BishOp, Roosevelt,I, 471f. 
2· Goro h, Modern Europe, 356, 
3'B,n 
___ ., 111,68, No.82. 
31 
Be that as it may, the French Cabinet was sufficiently 
I 
alarmed to present a hostile front to Delcasse at the 
decisive Cabinet meeting of June 6, 1905, When supported 
I 
only by President Loubet, Delcasse was forced to reaign. 
In commenting upon his fall to the British Ambassador 
I 
to France, Delcasse said that he had been ready to make 
commercial concessions to Germany if she had been willing 
to talk, am though he would not have yielded anything 
politically or territorially, he would not have done any-
thing in Morocco which would have jeopardized Germany's 
treaty rights there •. Further, if England, France and 
Spain stood together, he said he did not believe that 
Germany would attack France. Moreover, Italy had boum 
herself to remain neutral as regards Morocco and not op-
pose France.I. It appeared to be evident the. t Germany was 
aiming at more than protection of her treaty rights. 
, 
Now, as to the effect which Delcasse's fall had 
upon the international situation and the nearness of the 
powers t 0 a conference: It seemed to be a triumph for 
German diplomacy to be thus able to eliminate the chief 
obstaole to its scheme. At least it must have seemed so 
tio the German Emperor, for he immediately raised Chancel-
lor von Bulow to the rank of Prince; it looked 8S if he 
meant to celebrate the initial success of Germany's 
Moroccan policy. However, an interesting thing happened, 
l·Ibid., 78, No. 96. 
32 
and no doubt, a startling one for Germany, the fact 
that only a slight change in French foreign policy was 
noticeable upon Rouvier's assumption of the office of 
Foreign Minister. i • Rouvier continued to demand a 
direct understaming wi th GertJl8ny, but he approached 
hiB opponent in a more subtle way than his predecessor. 
He informed the Gertllln Ambassador tha t he had no liking 
for a conference, but that if he did accept the Sulten's 
invitation, there would have to be a preliminary under-
I 
standing with Germany. He said, "We think a conference 
dangerous without previous agreement, and useless with 
-----
it"' (Italics mine)!· The French, however, did not definite-
ly refuse acceptance. 
William II was inclined to favor Rouvier's suggestion 
of an exchange of notes between the powers rather than a 
eonference, but not so Bulow, who once more appealed to 
President Roosevelt to take a hand in the matter and per-
suade France and Great Britain to agree tc a conference. 
He represented the conference to Roosevelt in the light 
of an alternative to war. The letter, never very well 
informed on European affairs, seems to have accepted the 
Chancellor's interpretation of the Situation, for he re-
luctantl.,. promised to do what he could. Roosevelt decid.ed 
it would be useless to speak to Engla.nd for, to quote him, 
l·Ibid., 97, No. 126. 
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"I felt that if a war were to break out, whatever mig,.t 
happen to France, England would prof'!. t imm.ensely, while 
Germany would lose her colonies and perhaps her fleet. 
Such being the case, I did not feel that anything I 
migh t say would carry any weight with England, am in-
stead I made a very earnest request of France that she 
do as tls Emperor desired (Bulow, of course, spoke 
, 
through the Emperor) and agree to hold the conference" .1. 
While expressing to France the "real sentiment" Which he 
had for her, he impressed upon her the danger of war to 
the French, pointing out that in such a. contingency Great 
Britain could help France but little on land B.nd tm t she 
had no reason to believe that a conference would allow 
Germany unjustly to attack French interests. In eddition, 
he not only promised not to accept an invitation to a 
oonference, except on condition or France doing likewise, 
but also promised that if he went he would be absolutely 
impartial, standing firm against any German B.ttitude 
smaeking of unfairness.~· On June 23 France gave in. 
At once Roosevelt suggested to Germany the dang~r of war 
to them also, that Germany could not be sure she would 
win, since France was bound to be suppor'ted. He pro-
posed that a program of tl:e conference be arranged between 
Germany and France, end hinted that inasmuch a s France had 
accepted the conference it would be advisable on Germany's 
part to make a tew concessions to her, else the Kaiser's 
"high and honorable tame might be clouded" should war 
result. 
I·Bishop, Roosevelt,I, 483f. 
2.Ibid., 4'78. 
When Roosevelt's mediation is closely examined, 
it will be seen that as a result of it Germany,by accept-
ing Roosevelt's suggestion that a program be agreed upon 
before the Conferenc e, was rea 11y the ne. ti on whic h backed 
down. France bed already accepted the Conference in 
principle when Rouvier stated on June 21 that if Prance 
accepted the Sultan's invi tation there would have to be 
a preliminary understanding. Germany, who had at first 
demanded prancels acceptance of the Conference without 
any sort of discuss ion prior to its meet1ng, now found 
agreement on the program acceptable, but insisted it 
should folloW France t s assent. France, on the other 
hand, demanded an agreement· on the program before giving 
her formal consent to attend a conference]. France 
wanted to keep her hands free; she wanted to be able to 
back out of the Conference if a progr~m to her liking 
could not be decided upon. At this junoture, Roosevelt 
onoe more came to the re scue • He proposed tbl t 'France 
and Germany accept tm ~ollowing: '''The two governments 
consent to go to the Conference with no program, and to 
discuss all ~estions in regard to Morocco, save, of 
course, where either is in honor boum by a rrevious 
"2 agreement wi th another power.· Germany accepted. readi-
ly; France anly after Rouvier despaired of being able to 
avoid a conference. An accord was signed by the two 
l·Anmerson, Moroccan Crisis, 252 from ~.,xx, 
485f., No 6'746. 
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Powers July S, 1905; by the terms of whioh Franoe 
accepted the Conferenoe on the understanding with 
(Jermany that her right s be respeoted and thlt her 
arrangements with England and Spain not be questioned 
nor the open-door po1ioy a1tered. i • Four dals later 
Great Britain agreed to tb9 Conference, a 1though, she 
had backed France in opposition to it up to the verl 
last. 
One na tion in particular felt great relief over 
the acoord. That nation was Ita1l. Though she cared 
little enough about a oonferenoe, she cared less about 
a war which would have revealed her anomalous position 
in a glaring light. It should be mentioned the t the 
Emperor, in thEllking Roosevelt for his good offices, 
instructed the German Ambassador to t~ United States 
t 
to sa7 that "In case during the coming Conferenoe dif-
ferences of opinion should arise between France and 
Germany, he in eve17 case will be readl to back up the 
decision wbich you (~eodore Roosevelt) should oonsider 
to be the mOB t fair and the moat pre,otioal."~· 
The ace ord of July Sth won for (Jermany French 
acceptance of the Conference without a preliminary agree-
ment on a program, but France was protected by the guar-
antee that her arrangements with Spain and Great Britian 
l·Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, 
59 Cong., 1 sess., House of Repr.; Dec. 1., serial 
No. 4941, P 668. 
2·Blshop, Roosevelt, I. 48~. 
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were not to be questioned. Thus, her special position 
in Morocco was recognized. 
Begotiations regarding a program were begun at 
once, lasting sbout three months. The discussions soon 
came to revolve around several controverted points. 
Police and 1"inencla1 reforms were the main issues at 
stake. In regard to the first, France • ..,s determined 
that the regulst ion 01" police on the Alger! ell border be 
settled direct17 between her end Morocco, whereas Ger-
many considered that the question of berder police should 
be an international olle.l • Bulow was willing th!.t the 
military and police mandate 10 Morocco be divided among 
the Powers in such a way that France receive the exclu-
wive mandate 1"or the 1"rontier region, provided that Ger-
mauy receive a mandate 1"01" some Western Moroccan coast-
al towns trom Rabat south.2 • This was naturally unac-
ceptable to France; hence, GermanY' clung to ent1re inter-
nationalization 01" police. Germany also demanded that 
the Con1"erence Eet at Tangier; twice Franoe re.1ected the 
proposal. Relations between the two nations were further 
strained (1) when the Moroccan government ~ranted to a 
German firm on July 30th a contract for building a break-
water in the harbor of Tangier and (2) when a group of 
German banks loaned the sultan 10,000,000 marks. It was 
l·B.D., III, 131ff., No. 114. 
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rumored that Tattenbaoh, the German envoy, helped to 
presuade the Koroooan government in these matters. 
Though he upheld the transaotions against Frenoh com-
plaints, Bulow reprimanded Tattenbach because his ao-
tions had oomplicated the negotiations. In the mean-
time, spain's offer of a town in southwest Spain as a 
meeting place reoeived no reply from Germany. 
At about this point, however, Chanoellor von 
Bulowreoognized that Germany must alter her policy or 
lose face in the fami17 of nations. Therefore, he 
sent to Paris one Dr. Rosen who had advised the German 
government to DIl.lee a concession on the meeting place 
and to withdraw her demands in regard to regulations 
of police on the frmtier. But at t he same time Ger-
many should try to obtain an exact definition of the 
limits of the frontier region. France should then 
give wa7 on the question of the mole ani tls loe.n. 
~n be got to Paris, Rosen decided to make a conces-
sion by Germany on tbe rrontler question contingent 
upon France's disclaiming any intention to control the 
financial or police reforms in the Whole of Morooco. 
The French government refused, but offered to include 
in the discussion at the Conference ~ matters which, 
though not pertaining direotly to Morocco, Germany was 
interested in -- such as the Bagdad and Camerun rail-




At this juncture, came the intervention ot Count 
Wi tte, who was returning to Russia trom Portsmouth, Maine, 
where he had represented Russia in the peace negotiations 
between that country and Japan. Russia was anxious to 
negotiate a loan with her ally, France, an impossibility 
until the business concerning the Conference was cleared 
up. Be stopped orr in Germany and urged the German gov-
ernment to give way. The GerDfln Ambassador to France, 
Radolin, was willing, as was Emperor William who was 
siCk of the Moroccan af'f'air. The Gernlln govemment de-
cided to heed Count witte's advioe, tor, af'ter all, it 
was not in a position to fight France. The umerstand-
il'lg was reached september 28. The program of the Con-
f'erence was to include: 
(1) police ref'orm and suppression of' contraband 
traf'f'ic in arms by way ot an international 
accord, except in the frontier region Which 
should be the exclusive conoern of France and 
Morocco. 
(2) creation ot a Moroccan state bank;stabliza-
tion of Moroccan monetary system; advance-
ment ot funds to pay police and carry out 
urgent public works. 
(3) Improvemen t of IIl9thods of collecting the 
cust01l8 and raising revenues. 
(4) lib alienation by the Sultan of any public 
service to the profit of particular interests. 
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(5) Principle of adjudication without regard to 
nR tiona1i ty to be followed in giving contracts 
for construction of public works. 
(6) Meeting of the Conference at A1genit-Jl8 in 
spain. l • 
There was a supplementa17 understanding which settled. the 
differences which arose over the Ger.n contract for the 
mole and the German loan. Rouvier took pains to declare 
that aside from the above agreement, he was not bound on 
any point. 2. The sultan bad little liking tor the pro-
gram presented to him but finally gave hi s consent on 
October 22. December 1 he sent out a circular letter of 
invitation to the Conference. The invitation was accepted 
by all the powers, including the United states, signatory 
to the Madrid Convention. 
During the time which elapsed betwee n the agree-
IISll t on tm program and the opening of the Conference, the 
powers chiefly interested took stock of their positions 
and the outlook fer them a t the Conference. The German 
gcwernDBnt, in particular Prince Bulow, considered there 
.as every reason to be hepeful about the Conference from 
the Germn standpoint. Germany looked tor the support of 
ADBrica, knowing that Roosevelt upheld the open-door policy. 
She expected no interference from Russia and had secured 
8. promise of support from her ally, Austria-HUngary, FUrther-
1.~, III, l42ff., No.184; l46f., No.lSS. 
2·Andre Tardieu, LaConterence DtAlferCiras, 
44f.; also Anderson, Moroccan crls s, 273 from 
L.j., 1901-5, 305f., Nol. 349t. 
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more, Germall1' had plal'ed upon Spain' 8 jea10U87 of Prance 
in MOrocco to the extent of preventing the appointment 
bJ' Spain of the antt-aerman Senor Villa -Urrutia as a 
delegate to the Conference. Sir A. Nicholson ... , British 
Ambassador to Spain, in reporting to his government a 
conversation between himself and Villa-Urrutia atated 
that the German Charge d Affaires had informed the Span-
ish government t lBt V.i1la -Urrutia' s appointment "would 
not be regarded in a friendl,. light b,. bis Governatmt."l. 
As for 'ItalY'. German,. believed that in order to prevent 
a war sm would. urge France to accept Germany' a terms. 
What is more, British public opinion was a little more 
friendly toward German,. with the coming into power in 
Great Britain in December, 1900 of a Liberal p:overnment. 
The Germans meant to work far tbB maintenance of the open 
door and economic equality far all, as well as, the com-
plete internationa1i~.tioD of Morocco (this would. apply 
to an,. bank established also), but if there was a division 
of mandated territory for police reforms, Germany was 
going to see to it that she received her share and one 
which would contain a port favorab1,. located far later 
expansion in the interior.. The Germans had one _j or 
concern and that was that the)" should not be isolated at 
the Conference; Bulow especial1,. urged an avoidance of 
this danger. Germany was practically isolated in Europe 
as it was, but if sbe won at the Conference. tbB Entente 
lea.D., III, 150, No. 192. 
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Cordiale, at least, would be definitely weakened. If 
she lost, her isolation would be publlcly demonstrated. 
No one was more aware of the bad e f'fect on the Angle-
French entente of French fallure at t~ Conference than 
Premler Rouvler who dld his best to find out exactly how 
far England would go in support of France. He relled on 
Russlan support because of the alliance wlth her and her 
dependence on France for a loan. He dld not expect oppo-
sition from either Austr1a.-Hungal'7 or Belgium. But Rouvier 
was not absolutely sure of' Britain, far which reason M. 
Paul CamOOn, French Ambassador to Great Britain, was in-
structed to sound that government's attltude. Sir Edward 
Ore,., the new foreign secretary, avoided the issue until 
some answer to the French Ambassador's polnt blank question 
had to be made. Grey reports his conversation with K. 
aambon ln a despatch to the British Ambassador to France, 
Januar,. 31, 19<15, by which time the Conference had already 
begun. He says: 
"The French Ambassador asked me again today 
whether France would be able to count on the 
assistance of England in the event of an attack 
upon her by Germany. 
I said that I had spoken on the subject to 
the Prime .inister (Campbell-Bannerman) and dis-
cussed it wi. th him, and that I had three observa-
tions to submit. 
In the first place, since the Ambassador had 
spoken to me a good deal of progress had been made. 
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OUr mili tary and naval authorities had been in 
communication with the French, arw:l I assumed that 
all preparations were ready, so that, if a crisis 
arose, no time would have been lost for want of a 
formal engagement. 
In the second place, •••• , I had taken an opportu-
nity of exp;oess ing to count Vetterrick (German Am-
bassador to Great Britain) my personal opinion, •••• , 
that, in event of an attack upon Frane e by GermaDJ, 
arising out of our Moroccan agreement, public feel-
ing in England would be so strong th8.t no British 




In the third place, I pOinted out to M. Cambon 
that at present France's policy in Morocco, •••• , 
was absolutely free, that we did not question it, 
that we suggested no concessions or alterations in 
it, that we left France a free hand and gave un-
reservedly our diplomatic support on which she could 
count, but that, should our promise extend beyond 
diplomatic support and should we take an engagement 
which might involve us in war, I was sure my col-
leagues would say that we must from that tiue be 
consulted With regard to France's policy in Morocco, 
and, if need be, be free to press upon the French 
governmen t concessions or alterations of their 
ttl policy which might seem to us desirable to avoid. • 
1. Ibid., lBO, No. 219. 
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The British gpvernment, as indicated in the above 
despatch, had already conceded the advisability of secret 
military and naval conversation between the two Powers, 
but through Sir Grey's adroit handling of the question 
of support of France 1n case of war, Englam managed to 
keep her bands free, Although Grey and Campbell.Bannerman 
emphatically expressed their allegiance to the Entente 
Cordtale, Grey knew that if France lost at 'the Conference 
the pDestige of the Entente would suffer, hence he de· 
clared that "our main object therefore must be to help 
France carry her point at the Conference."l, Thus, he 
determined that GermaD1 should formally recognize France's 
preponderant position in Morocco. 
Both the British and French urged Spain to remain 
loyal during the Conference. There was good reason for 
doing so, ~r, as the Spanish Prim$ Minister admitted, 
Germany bad been making persistent attempts to detach 
Spain from France am England. .2. When the Italian govern-
ment was approached by Great Britain to press the former 
for her support, she replied that because of her position 
in regard to tbl Triple Alliance she could make no promieer. 
In attacking the pt" oblem of police at tre Conference, 
Great Britain end France agreed to a suggestion. made by the 
Russian Minister at Tangier, that the police question be 
l·Ibid., 182, No. 20Q. 
2. Ibid., 167, No. 208. 
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discussed solely from a practical point of view, with 
out reference to its political aspect. When it became 
simply a question of the protection and safety of for-
eigners in Moroooo, it would appear quite logical to 
those acquainted with Morocco that the work could be 
best done by the FrenCh and the Spanish who were used to 
handling the natives there. l • Germany would be held 
responsible for breaking up the Conference if she re-
jected this plan. In the instructions given to the 
French delegates, French demands called for the commis-
sion to France and Spain alone of the suppression of 
contraband trade and of poliCing, and the establishment 
of a bank in whioh France should have a superior position, 
and which should not only be under the French legal system 
but have a French president. Internationalization of 
the police was to be absolutely refused as should be also 
any proposal placing a minor power in control of the 
police. It might be mentioned with interest that the de-
mands which Franoe intended to make at the Conference were 
practically identioal with the fallen Delcasse's aim in 
regard to Morocco. 
On January 16, 1906 the Conference of Algeciras 
was formally opened with the spanish Duke of Almodovar 
presiding. The town of Algeciras marked the landing 
place of the Moors in Spain on three sucoessfUl invasions, 
now, the scene of a meeting which promised to decide the 
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fate of their Empire. Modern Algeciras, dating from 
1160, is a quaint town with narrow cobblestone streets, 
plaster buildings with shutters, grill incased windows, 
and grilled iron balconies. In preparation of the Oon-
ference, the whole town had been whitewashed, the paving 
repaired, and the grass removed from the streets. Sessions 
were held in the Town Hall which boasted red carpet on 
its interior staircases and roWs of flower pots down the 
steps descending to the patio. The delegates met in the 
largest apartment in the Town Hall and. sat around a long 
T shaped council table covered with green baize. From 
the ceiling of the room were suspended many electric light 
bulbs the brilliant glare of which wss hardl,. softened by 
the shallow 1'luted shades above them.l • 
Algeciras W8S really a very poor choice 8S a confer-
ence town. There were only two hotels. The newspaper men 
were quartered at one am most of the dele-gates at the 
other, the Reina Oristina, a low-storied, bow-windowed 
structure under Scotch management. It was situated on the 
promontory which divides the Gulf from the Straits of 
Gibraltar, so that it faced the Rock of Gibraltar. Some 
of the delegates rented separate Villas, as did the British 
delegation, but at exorbitant prices. Nicholson, head of 
leFor description of Algeciras and the Town Hall see 
SJd,ney Brooks,"The United States at Algeciras", Harpers 
Weekly, 50:402; Henry O. Lodge, "The Monroe Doet~1ne 
aDd Morocco," ibid. 332-3, Portnlgntl~ Review, The 
Algeeiras oonference', 85; 9fO+7; Harol Nicolson, 





the English delegation, and his three assistants pa1d a 
rental of LIO per day for 84 days.l. 
The number in each delegation ranged fro~ fourteen 
in the French to two for those powers who attended the 
Conference simply because they were signators to the 
Madrid convention. The Moroccan party, however, includ-
ing eight regular delegates, numbered upwards of sixty 
persons, all of whom added a decidedly picturesque note 
to the assemblage of people 1n the town. They came 111 
Moorish attire wearing white robes and red and white tur-
bans.2• Furthermore, t1:e Moroccan delegates always rode 
to t~ meetings on 1II11eback. The ir head was S1d lfohammed 
Torres, an octogenarian, and a decendant of Spanish Arabs 
who once had occupied southern Spain. 1m fact, the old man 
, 
,1'1 
possessed the key of the house,..which his ancestors had 
lived at Oordova. He had a long whi te, spot les s beard. 
Be walked bent over an ivory-topped stick, wrapped from 
head to toe in a wh1 te wool mantle .3. A slight, smiling 
, 
man with a waxed mustache, M. Revoi1, headed the French 
delegation.4 • He was a subtle reasoner, but overcautious, 
l·FortnightlY Review, "The Algeciras Conferenc/,85:94:0. 
2·outlook, "Oonference of Algeciras," 82:103. 
3. " Salvatore Cortesi, Prom P~rtsmouth to Algeciras", 
Independent, 60: 1152. 
4:. For a descriptl~~ of the other delegates see 
Nicolson,Portrait of a Diplomatist,126ff.,Anderson, 
Moroccan drisis, 349 • 
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obstinate, and mistrusttul of Germany. Sir Arthur 
Nicholson, as mentioned above, was the leader of the 
British and prObably the most able person at the Con-
f'erence. Although tb3 b lue-eyed Ii ttle JlIUl had nothing 
in his pars mal appearance to command regard, since his 
f'rail person was twisted with rheumatism and arthritis, 
yet he had a sense of control and his qui$t3 work really 
brought the Conf'erence to a def'inite conclusion. Ger-
many sent as her leading representatives Herr von Rado-
witz, who was so old and feeble as to oount f'or practi-
cally nothing, and Count Tattenbach, whose unpleasant 
personality harmed his conntry's cause. Nicholson 
described him as a rasping, disagreeable Man, meither 
stra.ight-f'oward nor truthful, whose blunt aggressive-
ness created a bad impress ion.l • OUr representatives 
, 
were Mr. White, Ambassador to Italy, and Mr. Qummere, 
Minis ter to Morocco. The f'or1JJ3r was charming and c on-
ciliatory, but not very well inf'ormed. Italy sent 
the seventy-e1x year old Visconti venosta, white-haired 
and bewhiskered, one-time Ybreign M1nister under Cavour. 
Count Cassini, who was sociable but not very dependable, 
represented Russia. Count Welsersheimb was Austria.-
BDngary's chief delegate, as was the Duke of Almodovar 
f'or spain. Besides the regular delegates t~re were 
about fifty journalists. 
l·B.n., III, 243, No. 268. 
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Formal sessions were held from ten to twelve 
o'clock in the morning, am were reserved for ratifi-
oation of matters agreed upon unanimously in the com-
mittee of the wbole, composed of all delegates sitting 
unofficially and engaging in free debate.}· Conference 
committee meetings were held from three to five o'clook 
in the afternoon. The drafting and translating oom-
mlttees, the latter made up of the delegation inter-
preters, met whenever convenient. The members of the 
translating oODlnittees had the hardest work of all to 
do _ for they had the thankless task of translating 
Arabic into French and vice versa. The formal meet-
inggwere held at irregular intervals, about three times 
a week, or whenever the President of the Conference was 
advised that instructions had been received sufficient 
to issue a sUlllnons or when the drafting committee had 
some document ready to present for oonsideration. In 
all, there were about thirty sittings of' the Conference. 
They were, however, interspersed with agonizing periods 
of 'delay because the Moroccan delegates were f'orever 
referring to their government,a procedure which required 
about two week's time, since the Moroccans would make 
the trip across the Mediterranean to their country and 
l·por organization of the Conference see Fort-
nightl! Review, "The Algeciras Conference," 
85; 94 ; liderson, Moroccan Crisis, 350. 
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and back again. )lore important than the regular meet-
ings ot the Conference were the direct negotiations 
between the French and German delegatea, negotiations 
which became almost constant atter Januar7 25, 1966. 
Chapter III 
THE PROBLEM OF TIE STATE BANK 
--- -~--~- _.- --- --- ---~--~------ .-~---
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Chapter III 
The Problem of the State Bank 
The Duke of Almodovar, President of the Conference, 
in the opening speech expressed the principles which were 
to govern the work of the nations there assembled. He 
declared that everyone desired "reforms based on the 
triple principle of the sovereignty of the Sultan, in-
tegrity of bis empire, and equality 01' treatment in 
matters commercial, that is the open door." He said 
it was not the intention of the Conference to aevise 
a oomplete plan of reform tor Morocco, but rather to 
"study togetb3r the means of applying measures which at 
present appear to be the most urgent and easiest to in-
t~oduce."l·The Conference got busy at once on the pro-
blem8 which it could settle w1th the most taci11ty. 
These included the surveillance and repression 01' con-
traband arms; improvements in the collection 01' taxes 
and ways and means of creattng new revenues; regulations 
concerning customs duties and the repreSSion of fraud 
and 01' contraband; and a 4eclaration relating to public 
services and public works. 
When the above matters had been taken care of, the 
Conterence was ready to turn to the two major problems, 
the establishment of a state bank and the organization 
of police tn Morocco. The settlement of these two was 
l·B.D.,III, 229, Bo. 248. 
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TerT important, for it would not only determine the 
future of the Moroccan state but also greatly affect 
international politics an the European stage. Dis-
cussions on the bank and police proceeded, for the 
most part, simultaneously or alternately, one being 
taken up when the lrcrk on the other had struck a snag. 
The story of each of these problems, however, shall 
be discussed here separately. Although this method 
will not show so well the manner in which the chief 
delegates juggled the discussions to suit their own 
ends, it will have the ~eater advantage of giving a 
clearer, more connected acco\ll'It of the handling of each 
problem. In the consideration of both questions, the 
relationship between France and Great Britain must be 
constantly borne in mind. It is well expressed in 
Xing Edward's words to M. Cambon just before the Confer-
t 
ence: "Tell us what you wish an eaCh point, and we will 
support you without restriction or reserves. ft 'l. 
The problem of the state bank will be taken up first. 
The French, asSl ming the initiative, presented to Count 
Tattenbach on January 29 their plan for a bank. 'l"here 
were six major articles concerning the establishment,man-
agement, and control of such an institution. They provided 
for 
(1) A bank subject to French law and the French 
jud ic ial sys tem; 
l·Sidney Lee, King Edward VII, V.II, 361. 
(2) A division of capital as follows: Franoe, 
27%; spain, 23%; Great Britain, 20%; Germany, 
20%; Italy, 10%; 
(3) An administrative counoil of ten to be ohosen 
according to nationality by the shareholders; 
(4) A directory named by the council; 
(5) A committee of discount in Tangier seleoted 
from resident shareholders and a committee of 
examination to be chosen by future subscribers; 
(6) The preferential right to make loans held by 
Franoe to continue, but possible relinquish-
ment in return for an increase in the peroentage 
of capital to be given France. l • 
The French based their demands on their preponderant 
economic interests in Morooco, which they felt had to be 
recognized. From the French view point, it was a question 
of maintaining the open door without losing interests al-
ready acquired. To them "the open door (did) not signify 
that those who are in the house must leave. "2. 
The Germans, not yet ready to make any concessions, 
objeoted to France's olaim to preferenoe for making loans. 
They also proposed the use of the Egyptian mixed oodes and 
what was partioularly repugnant to the Frenoh _w the equal 
division of the capital among the Powers, a proposal which, 
l·Anderson, Moroocan crisis,352, from ~,XxI, l28ff., 
No.6974. 
2e Andre Tardieu, La conference, D'Algeciras, l4lff. 
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if accepted, would simply amount to the internation-
alization of the bank. Both governments became very 
busy tr7ing to win the other Powers to their support. 
Germany was anxious for Italy, Austria, and the United 
states to declare themselves in favor of her plan; she 
did not desire British mediation, for it might result 
in active English support of France. 
For the time -being, however, the q U3stion of the 
bank was allowed to ride while attention was turned to 
the pr oblem of the police. In the latter part of Feb-
ruar)' negotiations on the police reached a standstill. 
To prevent tb3 disruption of the Oonference, the Germans 
returned to the bank question and on February 20th both 
Franoe and Germany submitted their bank plans, revised 
s emewha t, to the cODllli ttee of the whole. Since it would 
only be confusing to describe each plan separate17, 
article by article, we sha 11 confine our a ttention to the 
major differences between the two proposals, the differ-
ences and the diplomacy connected with their adjustment 
constituting, after all, our chief interest in Franco-
German relations at the Oonference of Algeciras. 
In the first place the two countries differed over 
the location of the central office of the bank, which 
German,. thought should be at Tangier, while France insisted 
on Paris, possibly because French bankers would have a 
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superior 1nterest in the bank accorcling to the French 
plan. In the second place, Germany desired that the 
statutes governing the bank should be drawn up by a 
Conseil d'Admlnistratlon composed of two delegates 
from each national group and ratifled by a Consell 
de surveIllance composed of the dlplomatic representa-
tlves at Tangler. Also, she wished the bank to be 
subject to the Egyptlan mixed codes. According to the 
Prench plan, the statutes were to be drawn up by a 
c011l'l1lttee chosen .from the various subscribing groups 
and ratified by the stockholders, the bank to be sub-
ject to the French law and the French judicla1 system. 
A thlrd major di.f.ferenae was in the supervision o.f the 
bank. The German plan called for supervislon by the 
Conseil de Survelllanoe, mentloned above, and manage-
ment by the Consell d'Adminstration, also mentloned 
above, under the guldanoe o.f a director chosen by the 
last uentioned. body. The French, on tm other hand, 
desired the bank to be directed by a Consell d'Adm1nls-
tratlon composed of .fl.fteen (15) members selected by 
the shareholders, eaCh chosen from the natlonality of 
the subscriblng group. Thls body was to select the 
bank offlcers and determine thelr power. In addltion, 
there was to be a hlgh commissloner chosen b,y tm Moroc-
can govemment to watch over the bank for the Sultan. 
The fourth, am really the most important difference 
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between the two plans, oonoerned the division of oapital. 
Germany flatly demanded an equal division of the oapital 
among the powers, as she had done from the first. The 
Frenoh plan would divide the oapital into fifteen parts, 
eleven of whioh should be subsoribed by finanoial groups 
in Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Belgiun, Spain, the 
United States, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden 
With no power having more than one part; the remaining four 
parts would be given the ~enoh group of banks whioh had 
made the Moroooan loan 1n 1904. Franoe was demanding for 
her banks the rigbt of subsoribing a greater share of the 
capital than her first plan oalled tor; but she did so to 
gain compensation for her present willingness to relinquish 
the right of preference for making loans to Morocco, a 
privilege to whioh Germany bad objeoted strenuously. 
Garmany opposed the French plan on the ground that 
it would make the bank a Frenoh institution and not an in-
ternational one. Franoe returned With the argument that 
the German proposals completely ignored Franoe's rights 
and superior interests in Morocco, that they oreated not 
an economical institution but a political one, aimed at 
France. FUrthermore, Franoe held that Germany's plan was 
impraoticable because diplomatic representatives were not 
qualified to assume the responsibility in regard to the 
bank which Germany chose to give them.l • Beoause the plans 
1. 
B.n.,III, 265f., No. 298. 
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were so conflIcting, dIscussion of them waa deferred 
untIl France and Germany should negotiate f'u-ther. BJ 
Karch 3 it appeared as if the Conference was on the 
verge of failure, for an impasse had been reached on the 
question of the police as well as that of the bank. The 
major opponents busied themselves, as before, in trying 
to win the lesser powers to theIr support. Their activi-
ties will be taken up in greater detail in connection with 
the more important problem of police. 
The English, particularly Foreign secretary Grey, 
were very pessia1stic over the outlook of the Conference 
and were concerned lest France be held responsible for its 
disruption. " Sir Arthur Nicolson, therefore, and M. Revoi1 
BOUght a means to prevent a break up of the Conference over 
the bank question. They decided to bring up the police 
question and push it through to some kind of conolusion, 
favorable to Franoe it was hoped. Rupture of the Confer-
ence over the bank would create a very bad impression on 
public opinion; f'or the bank question was not as readily 
understandable as the police question, and people would 
not comprehend why the financial difficulties could not be 
settled favorably by both parties. The police question 
was accordingly taken up, but was once more dropped tempo-
rarily when no agreement could be reached. 
Finally, on March 11th the Conference turned again to 
the bank upon the proposal by Nicolson, with the approval 
of Revoil, that there should be chosen three censors 
-----_.- ---- ------- ----~ 
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(later, four) who should oversee the bank and submit 
their reports to a council of adminatration bt the bank. 
The German representatives accepted the proposal on con-
dition that the censors be chosen by the respective gov-
ernments trom the pers anne 1 of the banks interested in 
the Moroccan state bank and on condition that the Sig-
natory Powers receive copies of the censor's reports, 
"as being the only waf of assuring the international 
State character of the right of control, a point of View, 
in our (the!' German) opinion, to be observed tmder all 
circumstances-. l • 
Bf this time, however, Germany had given up her • 
demand for equal division of the capital but was willing 
to concede only three (3) shares as against the four (4) 
demanded by France. The various Powers Ul"ged Germany to 
cOJDPl'omise. In the meanwhile, the Austrians had brought 
forth their compromise proposal concerning the police. 
On March 23 Count 'Welsersheimb inf.ormed M. Revoil in pri-
vate conversati·oft that if France would make some concessioft" 
Germal11' might give up her demand for ne"ililral police at the 
port of Casablanca.2• The Co~t's suggestion was a happy 
one, for Revoil indioated Prance's willingness to accept 
onl7 three (3) shares in the bank. 
l·G.D.D.,III, 245, XXI, Ho. 2"72. 
2·B•D., III, 319f., No. 3"79. 
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The question of the degr€e of international con-
trol which should exist over the bank was not solved at 
this point; Germany, in expected contrast to France, 
thought that the various governments ani the diplomatic 
corps at Tangier ought to have some authority over the 
censors. However, mediation triumphed again in the tace 
ot French refusal to give way, and on March 26, both Ger-
many and Prance made concessions on the control ot the 
bank. 
At the last moment, France met with complications 
in the shape of Spain. According to the Franco-Spanish 
agreement, Spain 11' auld rece ive her share from France 
later on. She now demanded it at once, but France re-
~sed, and Spain had to content herself as best she 
could. 
At last, the problem of the bank was settled, the 
decisions pertaining thereto being br1efly summarized, as 
follows: 
(1) There were to be four (4) censors selected 
with the approval of their gevernments by the 
Banks of England, Germany, France e.nd Spain, 
and charged 11'1 th the duty of supervising the 
administration of the bank. They were to make 
an annual report. 
(2) There were to be a council of administration 
and a High Commissioner appointed by the Moroc-
can Government. 
--- -- -- -------
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(3) The State Bank of Morocco was to have the 
exclusive privilege of issulng bank notes. It 
was to act as the state treasurer, recelving, 
for lnstance, the customs dutles, and was to 
furnish the funds for the organlzation of the 
pollce and for public works as well as to neke 
loans to the Government up to a milllon francs. 
(4) The total capital was to be flfteen (15) to 
twenty (20) million francs dlvlded lnto flfteen 
(15) shares, three (:3) golng to France, and the 
remalnder to be divided among the signatory 
powers. 
Chapter IV 
'!'HE PROBLEM OF THE POLICE 
Chapter IV 
The Problem of the Police. 
The question of the Moroccan police was by far the 
more important of the two major problems facing the Con-
ference. France at the very beg1nning was prepared to 
accept some degree of internationalization in regard t~ 
the state bank, but she entertained no suCh ideas about 
the police. In fact, Revoil informed the American and 
Italian delegates that France would prefer the status 
quo. to any police arrangement which might be inimical to 
........ 
her influence in Morocco. l - Confusion characterized 
German policy at the Conference as it had throughout the 
whole Moroccan affair. For that ~tter, confusion had 
been the keynote of Berman foreign policy in general since 
the Iron Chancellor had taken a back seat. An example 
of this instability was to be found in the many reports 
of various German police proposals which were current 
and which were well calculated to bewilder the FrenQh. 
In this situation, Nicolson urged Revoil to be 
frank and open and lay his proposals before the German 
delegates. Such a procedure was not in harmony with Revoil's 
nature, but he finally agreed to accept Nicolson'S advice. 
The plan which the French presented on February 3 provided 
that the Frenoh and Spanish together be given a mandate 
for the police. As a guarantee of commercial equality, 
I-Nicolson, Pontrait of a Diplomatist, 132. 
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there should be international agreement upon the form, 
extension, and control of the mandate. 
In the meantime, the Germans had drawn up three 
possible plans, .outl1nes of which were dispatched to 
Washington, January 20. '!'he tJ.rst provided fer the or-
ganization of the police by the various powers in sepa-
rate districts, each·power to assume a mandate for a port 
on the Atlantic coast. Unity of policy was to be achiev-
ed by general agreement on such Questions as those of arm-
ing and training. The second plan would entnust the entire 
police organization to a small power, preferably Switzer-
land. According to the third plan the Sultan should organize 
his own police With the aid of volunteer officers chosen by 
the Sultan himself or by three of the small powers:· On 
the twenty-third Baron sternburg explained the plans to 
secretary of state Root who, saying that he personally ap-
proved Number 3, promised to consult President Roosevelt 
about the matter. The American representative at Algeciras 
informed his government that the plans were not practicable. 
Both the French and English delegates rejected them on the 
same grounds. 
On January 24 there appeared in Si~cle a solution sug-
gested by a French writer, M. De Lanessan, which it will be 
seen followed closely the lines of aermaqy's third plan. 
Said M. De Lanessan: "There remains only one admissable 
1. Anderson, Moroccan orisis,353; B.D.III,235, No.256. 
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solution; to charge the Sultan with the policing of his 
empire while determining the means by which he should 
have control and while instituting an international con-
trol over the organization and employment of those means. "1. 
Bulow seized upon this plan at once and urged President 
Roosevelt to sponsor it. The United States Government was 
informed by Germany that AUstria, Italy, aDi Russia approv-
ed this scheme. This was on the thirtieth. Nicolson re-
reported to his government, however, that German, had inti-
mated to the Spanish Foreign Minister on the twenty-sixth 
the possibility of a combination for police, made up of 
France, spain, Italy and Germal11~· Harold Nicolson points 
out that Germany was also suggesting both at Madrid and in 
Italy that the police be entrusted to Spain &lone.S This 
he calls Germany's "smoke-cloud" policy. 
Though sympathetiC to the De Lanessan plan, the 
Italian, American, and Russian delegates expressed their 
approval 0 f the P'rench plan of February 3 as the most mod-
erate and practicable e Tattenbach's efforts in private 
conversation with Nicolson on February 3 to get the latter 
to urge concessions on the part of France were a failure. 
Radowitz advised the German government to compromise, but 
Bulow was unwilling. It looked as if the Conference was 
leAnderson, Moroccan CriSiS, 354, from G.P.,XX,123ff., 
lio.6968. --
2e~, III, 239, No.262. 
3eNicolson,portrait of a Diplomatist, 133. 
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going to break up inasmuch as France als 0 refused to 
yield. Mr. White notes in a telegram to his government 
on February 5 his belief that "France will allow the Con-
ference to fail rather than recede from it (her position) 
ttl. 
• • • • Austria even urged h$r ally to agree to the 
French plan w1th mod1ficat1ons. Germany was still hope-
ful of United states med1ation but received no definite 
reply from Washington to her advances. Count Witte wrote 
to his German fr1ends advocat1ng the necessity of a con-
c111atory spirit on the part of Germany and pointing out 
the very apparent superior interest or France in Moroccofl· 
Finally, on February 13 Radowitz spoke d1rect1y to 
M. Revoi1 subm1tting a new plan which the French delegate 
very reluctantly transmitted to his govemment. The new 
plan contained these provisions, 
(1) The Sultan should organize the police force to 
be established in certain specif1ed localities 
and to be commanded and organized by foreign 
officers freely selected by him. 
(2) The state bank should supply fUnds tor the es-
tablishment of the police foroe. This provision 
caused no difficulty. 
(3) The diplomat1c body at Tang1er should exercise 
control over the execution of the police organi-
zation. 
l·A.L.p.Dennis, Adventures in American D1tiloma; 
1896-1906, 501. Hereafter thIs work wIlle o!~ as 
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(4) A superior foreign officer or inspector-
general should be selected trom one of the 
minor Powers to inspect the police force and 
report to the diplomatic body at Tangier. 
(5) The plan should be an experimental project to 
last from three to five years. l • 
If Germany expected to gain support for the above, she was 
again to be disappointed, since the important powers all 
more or less openly expressed their disspproval. The 
Austrians once more pressed Germany to compromise, because 
the former country was suffering so with domestic troubles 
that she did not wish to be involved in an international 
conflict certain to occur if the Conference broke up with 
out a settlement. Germany replied with a show of bluster. 
On the same day that she presented her plan, GermmlY sent 
the following cryptic telegram to Rome, Washington, Vienna, 
London, and Sa~ Petersburg: 
"No reason for a further retreat is evident. 
The principle of sacrificing one's own interests 
merely because they block the way for another Power 
could lead to such serious consequences that we con-
sider a disruption of the conference as the lesser 
evil.,,2. 
l.~, III, 25'7, .No. 28'7. 
2·Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 359, from G.P., XXI,159f. 
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In other words, Germany was serving notice on the powers 
to the effect that if they did not want the Conference to 
break up they had better persuade France to give in, for 
Germany wruld not. Germany at this time also complained 
of the anti-German flavor of the French press, responsi-
bility for which Rouvier emphatically denied. 
Germany's bullying attitude served merely to alien-
ate the one power she had most depended upon with the ex-
ception of Austria, and that was the United States._ To 
Ambassador JU8serand's request early in ~ebruary that 
Roosevelt intervene in favor of the French plan, the French 
government received a favorable reply. France could now 
be certain of British, American, and Russian support, a 
practical guarantee of success. 
But Prance did make an attempt to reconcile the Ger-
man plans with her own demands. She did so at the instance 
of the Italian delegate, who, naturally, was most anXious 
to prevent a failure of the Conference. In a memorandum 
Revoil informed Radowitz on February 16 that France would 
accept the German plan provided the Sultan chose French 
and Spanish officers and that the question of the Inspector-
(Jeneral be left to the Conference to decide).· The pro-
posal was rejected. Then it was that the American Govern-
ment stepped in. 
1. Nicolson, Pontrait of a Diplomatist, 136. 
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on February 19,1906, secretary Root submitted to Ambassa-
dor sternburg an American plan. It consisted of four (4) 
main points: 
(1) The Sultan should organize his own police 
force, the men and officers of which should be 
Moors. 
(2) The proposed state bank should supply the money 
to main.tain the police. 
(3) French and Spanish officers should assume the 
duties of ins truction, discipline, pay" B.m 
assistance in management and control. They 
should be appointed by the Sultan and should re-
port annually to the Government of Morocco and 
to the Government of Italy, which latter Power 
should have the right of inspection. 
(4) France and Spa in should guaran te e the open door}.· 
Although the French press was hostile to the American pro-
posals, the French government egbeed to accept them. 
As for Germany, Bulow at first refused completely to 
accept the plan, but on second though~apparently, the 
German Government decided to express its objections, which 
were embodied in a memorandum from sternburg to Roosevelt on 
February 22. sternburg stated that the Emperor agreed on all 
pOints but the third. The Emperor conSidered that point 
three was practically the same as the French proposal which 
required that the Sultan choose only Spanish and French 
1. d B 4 9 f Quote in ishop, Roosev8!i I, 8 f • 
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officers. The Emperor said that he objected to an arrange-
, 
ment of this kind because it "would place the police forces 
entirely in to their (the French am Spanish) hands, and 
the police organization would be tantamount to a French-
Spanish double mandate and mean a monoply of these two 
countries, which would heavily curtail the political, and 
, 
economic positions of the other nations." 1. Germatl7 
then suggested that the Sultan should (I) choose the offi-
cers from among the nationa participating in the state 
bank, and (2) select them from at least four different 
mationalities, this last to allay French fear that the 
Sultan might choose only Germans. Furthermore, it was 
suggested that Fr811ce might be allowed complete control of 
police in Tangier, or some other port, by way of recogniz-
ing her special rights in Morocco. Officers of various 
nations should cooperate in all other ports.2 • Roosevelt 
end Root refused to mediate on the basis thus outlined by 
Germany, since they knew quite well that France would not 
accept such offers. 
The Conference had now reached a crisis. It was 
evident enough if the Conference broke up France would not 
be considered responSible, but that fact, however, would 
be small comfort in the face of a terrible war. The German 
Ambassador to Russia expressed to the Russian Foreign Mini-
ster his difficulty in understmnding his government's ob-
l·Ibid., 49lf., 
2. Ibid., 492. 
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t 
stinate defense of a right, "which all other Powers, in 
view of the practical solution offered by the French, are 
, 
ready to give up." 1. The English were very pessimistic. 
Grey suggested to Germany that if the Moroccan affair was 
settled he would do his bes t to bring about an Anglo-Ger-
man rapprochement, so greatly desired by Germany because 
of her growing isolation on the continent. The Duke of 
Almodovar even submitted to the French and British repre-
sentatives a police proposal to prevent the Conference from 
failing. The plan, which provided for foreign instructors 
at only two ports, France and Spain to have oneeach, was 
considered simply impossible by England and France; but 
they heartily thanked Spain for her loyalty. Throughout 
this period Russia also was active in efforts to find a 
way out of the dilemma. Lansdorfr urged the United States 
to intervene at Berlin and instructed Russian Ambassador 
to Germany to leave no doubt in Prince Bulow's mind that 
if Germany broke up the Conference, Russia would regard 
2. her as the aggressor. 
The British and French delegates consulted one 
another in regard to their procedure in ",iew of a possi-
ble rupture of the Conference. They agreed that a rup-
ture should not occur over the bank question; therefore, 
a consideration of it at this juncture must be avoided 
l·Anderson, Moroccan CrisiS, 36~ from ~, XXI, 
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for the reasons mentioned in connection with the dis-
cussion of the problem of the bank. France's concili-
atory spirit and moderation showed up best on the police 
question. In the second place the two Powers determined 
that responsibility for a rupture should not fallon 
either of them. 
on February 23 the Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph, 
actually intervened to the extent of requesting the Ger-
man Ambassador to Austria to urge moderation on the part 
of his goverrunent.L The Emperor feared that in case of a 
vote at the Conference, Germany and Austria would be iso-
lated. He feared also that the ties between Russia and 
the two members of the Entente Cordiale would grow closer. 
His mediation, like that of the other powers, met with 
lit tIe apparent success ~. An example of the instability 
of German policy is to be found in the fact ths. t Holstein 
now tried to open direct negotiations with France. Premier 
Rouvier refused to consider suCh a procedure. 3 • 
At length, when some sort of action became absolutely 
tmperative,the Russian Foreign Minister proposed that a 
vote of the powers be taken on the police question. The 
suggestion was not wholly acceptable to R~voil and Nicolson 
because, as they very reasonable argued, the delegates of 
the 1e8s interested powers, like the United States, Italy, 
Holla~B81gtum, and Sweden would probably hesitate to vote 
I.Anderson,Moroccan Cri8is,3~4,fr.G.P.XXI,2135,No.7039. 
2.~,III,279. No.320. 
3·Andr~ Tardie,LaConference D'&1s!ciras,241ff. 
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and the tact that the Conference preferred the French 
police proposal would not be made plain to German.,. It 
German., should remam obdurant in the tace of an unques-
tioned support of France by the Conference, she would then 
have to accept the blame for the Conference's failure. l • 
Karch 3 marked the turning point 1ft the Conference, 
for, on that day came the opportunity for which France 
and England were waiting. The Italian delegate, M. Vioonti 
Venosta, and Radowitz proposed to suspend the Conferenoe 
while the experts were conferring on the draft artioles 
on the bank question. Here was a chanoe to bring the 
polioe question under disoussion again, ani at the same 
time force a vote in which all the delegates would be 
likely to take part. Nicolson, therefore, moved that the 
problem of the polioe be taken up while the experts were 
at work on the bank. A vote was takErl. There were ten 
(10) votes in favor, three (3) opposed, the latter being 
oast by Moroooo, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Thus was 
German isolation at the Conferenoe glaringly revealed by 
vote on a mere point of prooedure. Even Italy had openly 
sided against her all'1.2. 
After what had just branspired, Tattenbaoh was ready 
to oonoede that his government was too obstinate.3 • But 
what is of more importance is Bulow's reoognition that a 
1.~,III, 2'74ff., Nos. 3121'. 
2·Anderson, Moroooan Crisis, 3'75,fr.G.P.XXI,204f., 
No.'7032, 233f., No. 7051. 
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decided change of policy on the part of Germany was 
needed. He took away the control of the Moroccan affair 
trom Holstein and assumed personal charge of it. From 
this point on, Germany slowly retreated, salvaging as 
best she could the remnants of her prestige. 
Austria had submitted a plan to Gertn8ny on the 
twenty~slxth of February which Bulow now seized upon as 
a means 0 f preventing the break up of the Conferenoe. 
Briefly, the plan provided as tollows: 
(1) The organization of police in Tangier, Saffi, 
Rabat, and Tetouan to be entrusted to France. 
(2) The organization of police in Mogador, Earache, 
and Mazagan to be entrusted to Spain. 
(3) In Casablanoa, the organization of the 'police 
to be under the oommand of a Swiss or Vutch 
officer who should be inspector over ell the 
police. 
(4) Tbe inepector to report to the diplomatio corps 
at Tangier, whioh should have general control 
over the reorganization of the police. l • 
Bulow accepted it on March 6 with the proviso that the 
commander at Casablanca choose his officers from other 
nationalities than French and Spanish. It will be seen 
that Germany was now willing that offioers of nationalities 
I·Anderson, Moroccan CrisiS, 377, from G. P.,XXI, 
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other than French or Spanish should be present at only 
one port. 
On the eigth, both the Austrian project and the 
French plan of February 16 were presented to the Confer-
ence. On the tenth, Count Radowitz moved that both of 
them be referred to a drafting committee. He said: 
"It seems to me that accord ought to be reached 
on the basis of the two pDDjects •••• That of the 
French delegation certainly contains proposals 
which deserve the most serious examination. They 
ought to complete those of the Allstro-Rungarian 
project."l. 
It must be admitted that Radowitz's suggestion was an 
intelligent one. Sir EdwardGrey was very much pleased 
with the Austrian proposal. He wrote to Nicolson saying 
that since Germany had conceded the substancet •••• "it 
would be a great pity, if France sacrificed the substance 
to the shadow. n2 • Nicolson was considerably disgusted 
when France refused to accept. However, inasmuch as the 
BritIsh had promised France their complete support, Nicol-
son contInued to champion the French cause. But in conver-
sation with Radowitz, he was told that Germanr would yield 
no more. Still, France remainded adamant. 
I· Ibid., 379, quoting from G.P.,XXI, 270, No.'085; 
also B.D!., III, 292f., No. 337. 
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At this inopportune moment the French Governement 
fell, causing painful delay until a new one should be 
formed giving Revoil the right to proceed with the nego-
tiations. Before his fall, Premier Rouvier had suggested 
three (3,) modifications in the Austrian plan: 
(1) The police instructors at Casablaaca should be 
French or Spanish. 
(2) France and Spain should determine the distribu~ 
tion of the ports between them. 
(3) The Inspector-General should report to the 
Sultan and not to the Diplomatic body at Tangier. 
The French also preferred a Dane as Inspector-General in 
place of a Dutchman, whom they feared might be under Ger-
man influence. l • In addition, they demamed that the In-
spector-General have inspection duties only. Although 
Venosta, White and Nicolson asked the German delegates to 
give way, the latter delcared that Germany poStively would 
not surrender her demand that the Inspector-Genera.l also 
be an instructor at one of the ports. 
On the ninth of March President Roosevelt reminded 
the Kaiser of his promise of June 28, 1905 to back up any 
decision which he (Roosevelt) should approve~. Roosevelt 
thought that Germany should accept completely the American 
plan of February 19. But Germany stuck to the Austrian 
plan and urged Roosevelt to support it. The President 
proved to be very much opposed to it, howevor, arguing 
l·Ibid., No. 336. 
2. 
Bishop, ~oosevelt, I, 493. 
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that a division of the ports among the powers provided 
for a potential partition of the territory. He said: 
"The immediate effect can only be the creation of three 
separate spheres of influence, •••• And the nations to 
whom these spheres are assigned may be expected tn the 
ordinary course of events to enter into complete controlrl • 
The situation thus far was ably summed up by Nicol-
son in a despatch to Grey dated March 13, 1906. 2 • It 
appeared that R'voil and his government thought that Ger-
many would yield further, although Nicolson had his doubts. 
Germany was determined on some form of tnternationalization 
of the police, which she hoped to aChieve through her de-
mand that a third power be in charge of the police at one 
port. France, on the other hand would not accept inter-
nationalism in any form. If, throu~ the inability of France 
and Garmany to agree, the Conference were to fail, in the 
opinion of the majority of the Conference, the responsi-
bility would now fallon France. Nicolson felt that if 
France wauld only yie ld on the point at issue, for tnstance, 
be willing to accept Swiss control at Casablanca, she might 
obtain her way in regard to the disputed questions con-
nected with the state bank. 
When the new French Government came into power, the 
i·Ibid., 498. 
2·Ben., III, 301., No. 345. 
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new Foreign Minister, M. Bourgeois, amazed the powers by 
, 
boldly renewing Revoil's instructions refusing compromise 
on the police. Some of the nations that had hitherto 
stood by France now expressed their disapproval. It was 
even feared in France that England might refuse her support. 
Great Britain, however unsympathetic she was with France's 
rather reckless behavior at this point, nevertheless re-
mained faithful. At it turned out, French audacity was 
entirely successful. Austria began to seek some new way 
out of the deadlock which should make it possible for Ger-
many to accept the French view in regard to Casablanca. A 
possible way out might be for Germany to give way on Casa-
blanca in return for some compensation on the bank question. 
However, before Austrian mediation took shape, the 
United states intervened again in favor of France. Roose-
velt proposed that French and Spanish officers in about 
equal numbers should cooperate in each of the ports under 
the supervision of a general inspector from another nation. 
All along Roosevelt had disapproved of any arrangement 
which might tend toward the partition of Morocco. He had 
become convinced that this was Germany's aim. He informed 
Sternburg if Germany continued to reject American proposals 
and if the Conference failed, he would publish the entire 
correspondence; otherwise, in a public address, he would 
give Germany full credit for what was done.1· On March 19 
Germany accepted the plan and Roosevelt was delighted. 
l·BishOp, Roosevelt, I, 500f. 
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Dennis contributes the sudden yielding of Germany to 
three (3) things: 
(1) The very real desire on the part of the Kaiser 
and Bulow to av o1d an European war,. 
(2) Roosevelt's threat to publish all the corres-
pondence pertaining to the Conference. 
(3) Germany's appreciation of the tact that public 
op1n1on in the world and espec1ally 1n America 
was hostile to Germany.l. 
But the story d1d not end with German acceptance of 
the American plan. When it was presented to France, she 
rejected it; likewise Spain, ror both nations opposed the 
idea of mixed police, except if necessary, in Tangier and 
Casablanca. Great Brita in naturally supported the France-
Spanish view. Nicolson expressed his tear that the United 
Sta tea I proposal was not practicable .2. In the tace of such 
OPPOSition, the United states Government did not insist on 
the adoption of its plan.3• 
Thus was the revised Austrian pDoject, Which was 
pending, rendered important once again. According to it, 
France and Spain were to be entrusted with the polic1ng of 
all eight ports; Germany's compensation tor giving way on 
Casablanca was to take the form of a sub stant ial lessen1ng 
in France's demands in respect to the division of the bank 
l·Dennis, American Dip1omacz, 505. 
2. B.D., III, 313, Nos. 360, 367. 
3· Ibid., 320t., No. 380. 
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oapita1 J. As matters stood, Germany gave up her demam 
for a neutral police at Casablanca in return for whioh 
France agreed to limit her sha.res in the bank to three. 
The degree of international control which should ex-
ist over the police still constituted a problem. Germa~ 
insisted that the Inspector be made responsible to the 
diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should also exercise 
general supervision over the police; while France, sup-
ported by Great Britain and Spain, believed that the diplo-
matic corps should be excluded from participation in the 
matter. France desired that the settlement of the fore-
going question and of other details be left for determina-
tion later by France and Spain together with the Sultan. 
Germany wanted the Conference to divide the ports between 
France end Spain. Germany had made the great conceSSion, 
yet France continued to hold out despite the fact that the 
delegates, who were anxious to conclude the Conference, be-
lieved in general that ¥rence should make a concession in 
the matter of the inspector's responsibility. 
Mediation, however, began again. In the end, Germany 
agreed to a division of the ports by France and Spain with 
the approval of the Conference. Both powers made concession 
on the question of bank control. A formula regarding the 
responsibility of the inspector was worked out by the dele-
gates of France, England, Spain, Russia, and Italy meeting 
1·Ibid.,3l7, No. 379. 
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in oonsultation at Revoil's suggestion. The formula was 
submitted by Mr. White to the German delegates who aooepted 
it on Maroh 27. 
At the last moment, as in the oase of the bank question, 
Spain oomp1ioated matters between her and Franoe by asking 
for Tangier to whioh request France would not oonsent, offer-
ing instead the proposal that French and ~pan1sh offioers 
should jointly police Casablanca and Tangier. Spain had 
made her demand on the basis of the faot,that, according to 
the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904, only five ports were 
to be policed, but the Conferenoe had dealt with all eight, 
France desiring the extra three for herself. Although 
Spain at first refused the FrenCh deciSion, she finally ac-
cepted it on March 31. In addition, it was decided that 
there should be ~panish officers in Tetouan and Larache with 
Frenoh officers at the four remaining ports. Thus all eight 
ports were accounted for. The division agreed upon by 
France ani Spain was approved by the Conference, which also 
acoepted the following terms in regard to the police: 
(1) They should funcation for five (5) years. 
(2) They should be inspected at least once a year 
by a Swiss inspector stationed at Tangier who 
would be required to report to the Sultan. 
(3) The inspector should also make special reports 
to the dean of the diplomatic corps upon the 
request of that body.l. 
1·~.,326f., No. 386. 
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It will be seen that Germany's final concessions were that 
the Inspector-General should be an inspector only, with no 
detachment of his own, that he only report to the diplomatic 
corps and not be responsible to it, and that Casablsnca 
should not be policed by a third Power. 
The last draft was hastily drawn up and included a 
resolution pertaining to slavery in Morocco, which Nicolson 
had presented and to which the Moroccans uselessly objected 
on the ground that the question of slavery had not been on 
the agenda. The delegates appended their Signatures to the 
Act of A1geciras on April 2, the Conference formally con-
cluding on April ? The United states Senate ratified the 
Act in December 1906, but attached a protoca1 declaring 
that the Uhited states would not assume responsibility for 
the enforcement of the proviSions of the Act. 
It is interesting to note that on April 12, 1906 
Roosevelt, upon addressing a group of German war veterans, 
congratulated the German people and the German Empire upon 
the work accomplished by the A1geciras Conference~· He 
had kept his promise. 
14BishOP, Roosevelt, I., 501f. 
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CON C L U S ION. 
The Conference of Algeciras was a make-shift; it 
solved nothing permanently. Although the conclusion of 
the Conference relaxed the tension in Europe, the reforms 
agre~d upon were far from adequate to the needs of the U~-
fortunate Moroccan state. The right to police eight ports 
was not sufficient. to quell the general disturbances in the 
country, and yet enough to embroil the FrenCh and Spanish 
in clashes with the natives. In fact, Morocco was weak-
ened rather than strengthened by the Conference. The mass 
of the people were hostile to reform and turned more than 
ever to the rebel chief tan Rasouli and to the Pretender for 
leadership. Those few who, really hoping for reform, had 
believed in the powers' empty guarantees of Moroccan inde-
pendence and integrity, and who had placed their fatth in 
Germany, were keenly disappointed. They had expected that 
France would be properly trounced at the Conference. In-
stea~the powers had supported her. As one Moor has said 
"the Moors expected the Conference to study the industries 
of Morocco, the conditions surrounding the people, or the 
cause of the rebellions in the interior in order to cure 
them."l. It is not necessary to point out that the Con-
ference did nothing of the sort. 
l·A.X.Xaram,"The Morocoan Question as Seen from 
Morocoo" (North American Review, Nov 16, 1906) 
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The same writer has emphasized the fact that 
reform in Morocco should not be on Christian but on 
Mohammedan lines. He predicted that a police force 
like that called for by the Conference would be impossi-
ble in Morocco as long as the M~ootn mentel attitude 
was such that the Moroccans felt no need of one. FUrther-
more, the bank to be set up would not be of much service 
to the natives, for not only did they not understand the 
principles underlying the banking system, but their reli-
gion forbade them to deposit money in banks. Of course, 
this particular Moor was quite well B.ware of the fact 
that the reforms instigated by the A1geciras Conference 
were des1gned mainly for the benefit of foreigners in 
Morocco. opinion at the SUltan's court was divided on 
the question of acoeptance of the deoisions of the Con-
ferenoe. The Sultan delayed signing until June 18 when 
he did so with reservations. 
In the final analysis, the Conference of A1geciras 
was primarily an European affair. As the Italian oorres-
pondent of the Independent said on May l?, 1906, the dele-
gates really met to decide whether there should be 8. pare-
mount power in Europe and which power it should be. 
"Ancient hatred between France and Germany was coming to 
an issue, complicated by the racial and commercial antag-
onism.between Germany and England."l. The meeting of the 
l·S•cortesi, "From Portsmouth to A1geciras"., 
(Independent, May 17, 1906,) 1150. 
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diplomats rendered the situation actually dangerous. 
Delcasse made the serious mistake of not squaring 
Frenoh aspirations in Morooco with German desires before 
he sent his Mission of Reform to Fez. Germany considered 
that her prestige had been impaired, and the Conference 
seemed to offer her a way to regain it. She attempted also, 
through the Conference, to obtain some material interests 
in Morocco and to overthrow the prevailing balance of power 
in Europe. She aimed at the destruction of the Entente 
Cordiale as well as that of the Dual Alliance, if possible, 
or at least, modification of the latter. But her attempt 
to isolate France was a complete failure. She only suc-
ceeded in strengthening the very alignments she sought to 
destroy, whereas the Triple Alliance was visibly weakened. 
Through the Conference she had merely kept her pro-
mise to the SUltan to do what she could to preserve his 
sovereignty and had kept the way open for the future. On 
the other hahd, Germ9.D3' lost the confidence of Europe am 
what was more important to her, the confidence of the 
united states. She would have continued to enjoy the 
American Government's support, which she possessed when 
President Roosevelt helped her to bring about the Conference, 
if the United states had not finally realized that Germany 
was championing the cause of Morocco not for Morocco, not 
for the world, but for Germany. "We (Roosevelt and Root) 
, 
became convinced that Germany was aiming in effect at the 
83 
partition of Morocco which was the very reverse of what 
she was claiming to desire."l. If Germany's position 
had been a sincere one, she would have deserved the credit 
of the world. After the Conference, the resignation of 
Holstein from the foreign office was indicative of a cha~ 
of policy on the part of Qermany. There was nothing for 
Germany to do but keep quiet or work for her much desired 
Anglo-German Alliance, which she proceeded to do. 
what was the outcome of the Conference for France? 
To be sure, she did not make Morocco practically a French 
protectorate as she had hoped, but she did emerge from the 
Conference with international acknowledgment of her special 
territorial, adminstrative, and financial interests there. 
To her, then, went the fruits of Victory and to Germany 
the empty platter, although both Powers declared themselves 
to be satisfied with the results of the Conference. There 
was one other very ~portant benefit which France derived 
from the Conference. The Entent~ Cordiale had weathered 
the sto~m; it came out "a lasting, dynamic combination for 
checking Germany."2. 
After all is said anddQne, the thing to be remembered 
about the Conference of Algeciras is that it was not a single 
painful incident, but only one of many episodes, each con-
tributing its share of combustibles, and ending at last in 
the bloOdy conflagration which engulfed the world in 1914. 
l·Bishop, Roosevelt,I, 489. 
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